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A CAPSULE VIEW OF THE HISTORY AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC
INTEREST CONCEPT IN MINERAL
TAXATION*
Martin J. McMahon, Jr.t
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC INTEREST CONCEPT
The "economic interest" concept is the linchpin of the system of
special rules and principles governing federal income taxation of natural
resources. Understanding the "economic interest" concept is crucial to
understanding mineral taxation for several reasons. First, the right to
claim the depletion allowance under section 611 of the Internal Revenue
Code' (the Code) depends on the taxpayer's possession of an economic
interest with respect to the mineral property in question.2 This aspect of
the economic interest doctrine is most significant when a taxpayer re-
ceives income from a mineral deposit in which the taxpayer has no basis.
Even though cost depletion is unavailable because the taxpayer has no
* Copyright © 1991 by Martin J. MeMahon, Jr.
t Laramie Leatherman Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A.
Rutgers University; J.D. Boston College of Law; LL.M. Boston University.
1. I.R.C. § 611 (1988).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.61 1-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1973). For a general discussion of the depletion
allowance, see BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 13.1-.3 (1988) and Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Fundamentals of Federal Income Tax-
ation of Natural Resources, 3 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 225, 233-46 (1988) [hereinafter McMahon,
Fundamentals].
1
McMahon: A Capsule View of the History and Importance of the Economic Inte
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
basis, percentage depletion remains available. Allowance of percentage
depletion after basis has been exhausted, or even if the taxpayer never has
any basis in the deposit, is due to the dual nature of the depletion allow-
ance, which is in part a cost recovery mechanism and in part an incentive
for the development and extraction of mineral deposits.4
Second, a corollary of the right of a holder of an economic interest
to claim depletion is that royalty payments to other holders of an eco-
nomic interest in the same property are excluded or deducted in comput-
ing taxable income' and must be excluded from "gross income from the
property" in computing the payor's percentage depletion allowance.
Third, the economic interest concept is critical in determining
whether a transfer of an interest in a mineral property is a sale or ex-
change versus a lease.7 Characterization of the conveyance under local
law is irrelevant.' If the transferor has retained an economic interest
while conveying an economic interest to the transferee, the transaction is
treated as a lease. Both the transferor and the transferee will realize ordi-
nary income from extraction of minerals and be entitled to a depletion
allowance.9 If the transferor has not retained an economic interest, the
conveyance will be taxed as a sale.10 Gain or loss will be characterized
with reference to the purpose for which the taxpayer holds the property
and installment sale treatment may be available.11
Finally, holding an economic interest is a prerequisite for claiming
other important deductions, namely oil and gas intangible drilling and
development costs (IDC) under section 263(c) of the Code,12 solid min-
eral exploration expense deductions under section 617 of the Code,' 3 and
solid mineral development expense deductions under section 616 of the
Code. 4 But to claim these deductions the taxpayer must have more than
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1972).
4. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Coal Depletion Allowance Deduction, 85 W. VA.
L. REv. 581, 584-85 (1983).
5. See, eg., Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
6. I.R.C. § 613(a) (West Supp. 1991).
7. See, eg., O'Connor v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1 (1982).
8. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
9. The transferor and transferee will be entitled to a depletion allowance except to the extent
that § 631(c) of the Code prescribes § 1231 treatment for the lessor of a coal or iron ore deposit. See
generally McMahon, Fundamentals, supra note 2, at 352-63.
10. See, e-g., O'Connor, 78 T.C. 1.
11. See Rev. Rul. 73-428, 1973-2 C.B. 303; Rev. Rul. 68-226, 1968-1 C.B. 362.
12. I.R.C. § 263(c) (West Supp. 1991).
13. Id. § 617 (West Supp. 1991).
14. Id. § 616 (West Supp. 1991).
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a mere economic interest; the interest must be a "working" or "operat-
ing" interest.15
II. DEFINING ECONOMIC INTEREST
A. Judicial Origin and Regulatory Adoption
The Internal Revenue Code does little to help identify who is enti-
tled to the depletion allowance. Section 611(b)(1) of the Code provides
that depletion should be equitably apportioned between the lessor and
lessee; section 61 l(b)(2) provides that a life tenant is entitled to the entire
allowance, to the exclusion of remaindermen; and section 611(b)(3) and
(4) provide for apportionment of the allowance among trust and estate
beneficiaries. But no guidance is provided with respect to the various
interests into which mineral properties uniquely can be divided. Deter-
mination of the various interests entitled to depletion has been left to the
courts and the Internal Revenue Service.
Originally the Internal Revenue Service and the courts limited the
depletion allowance to taxpayers with a legal interest in the mineral de-
posit. Thus, even before the economic interest concept was coined or the
Internal Revenue Code expressly provided for apportionment of the de-
pletion allowance between lessors and lessees, the Supreme Court held
that a lessee of a mineral deposit was entitled to claim the depletion
allowance.16
1. Palmer v. Bender
The Supreme Court devised the "economic interest" concept in
Palmer v. Bender 7 in the course of resolving whether the assignor of an
oil and gas lease who had retained an overriding royalty realized gain
from the sale of property or ordinary income subject to depletion. Hold-
ing that the overriding royalty payments were ordinary income subject to
depletion, the Court found it immaterial whether the conveyance was an
assignment of a lease or a sublease. The formal attributes and characteri-
zation under local law of the interest obtained by the taxpayer did not
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965); Rev. Rul. 77-308, 1977-2 C.B. 208. Some cases dealing
with IDC deductibility, such as Marathon Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1987),
have confused the two concepts.
16. Lynch v. Alworth-Stevens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
17. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
1992]
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control."8 Instead, the Court formulated the now classic test for deter-
mining whether a taxpayer's interest in a mineral deposit gives rise to
ordinary income and entitles the taxpayer to the depletion allowance:
The language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at least, for
every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any in-
terest in the oil in place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship,
income derived from the extraction of the oil, to which he must look
for a return of his capital.... In the present case the two partnerships
acquired, by the leases to them, complete legal control to the oil in
place. Even though legal ownership of it, in a technical sense, re-
mained in their lessor, they, as lessees, nevertheless acquired an eco-
nomic interest in it which represented their capital investment and was
subject to depletion under the statute. 19
2. Treasury Regulations
Together with some gloss from two subsequent Supreme Court
cases,20 the Palmer v. Bender definition of an economic interest is incor-
porated in Treasury Regulation, section 1.611-1(b)(1), as follows:
An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer
has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in place ... and
secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the
extraction of the mineral... to which he must look for a return of his
capital .... A person who has no capital investment in the mineral
deposit . . does not possess an economic interest merely because
through a contractual relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuni-
ary advantage derived from production. For example, an agreement'
between the owner of an economic interest and another entitling the
latter to purchase or process the product upon production or entitling
the latter to compensation for extraction... does not convey a deplet-
able economic interest.21
B. Supreme Court Analysis of the Economic Interest Concept
The definition of "economic interest" provided by Treasury Regula-
tion, section 1.61 1-1(b)(1), does not begin to capture the wealth of com-
plexity in the development of the economic interest concept. Twelve
more Supreme Court decisions, handed down over the next fifty years,
along with a plethora of lower court decisions, flesh out the parameters
18. Id. at 557-58.
19. Id.
20. See infra parts II.B.3, II.B.10.
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1973).
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1. Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate
The year after Palmer v. Bender23 was decided, the Supreme Court
had an opportunity to apply the economic interest concept in Helvering
v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate.24 Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, the assignee of an
oil and gas lease, was required to pay the assignor cash royalties. The
issue was whether the lessee's gross income from the property for pur-
poses of computing percentage depletion had to be reduced by the cash
royalties paid to the assignor of the lease.2 5 Even though no provision of
the Code then expressly required that the lessee exclude royalties paid to
the lessor from gross income from property, the Supreme Court held that
such an exclusion was required when computing percentage depletion. 6
The Court reasoned that "[s]uch an apportionment has regard to the eco-
nomic interest of each of the parties entitled to participate in the deple-
tion allowance."' 27  Thus, the economic interest concept prevents
percentage depletion from being claimed by multiple persons having in-
terests in the deposit with respect to aggregate income in excess of total
production from the property.
2. Thomas v. Perkins
Three years later in Thomas v. Perkins,28 the Supreme Court held
that a retained production payment was an economic interest.29 Perkins
had acquired an oil and gas lease for $155,000 from a transferor who
retained a production payment of $395,000 to be paid out of one-fourth
of production. The issue was whether Perkins was required to include in
gross income the amount paid to the assignor-production payment
holder by the purchasers of oil from Perkins. Citing Palmer and Twin
Bell Oil Syndicate, the Court held that Perkins was not required to in-
clude the amounts paid to the assignor because the assignor was entitled
to depletion on the amounts received as its share of production.30
22. For a thorough discussion of the myriad of early cases, see Joseph T. Sneed, The Economic
Interest-An Expanding Concept, 35 TEx. L. REv. 307 (1957).
23. See supra part II.A.1.
24. 293 U.S. 312 (1934).
25. Id. at 315.
26. Id. at 321. This rule now is expressly provided in I.R.C. § 613(a).
27. Id.
28. 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
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Although the statement of the facts indicates that the provision for pay-
ment only in kind and the absence of an obligation to pay the assignor
cash were important, the Court found that it was irrelevant whether a
royalty was paid in cash or in kind, thus reaffirming the holding in Twin
Bell Oil Syndicate.3 The crucial factor in Perkins was the assignor's fail-
ure to obtain a lien for payment of the $395,000, indicating that payment
was to be made only from oil produced.
3. Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co.
In 1938 the Supreme Court handed down three decisions limiting
the scope of the economic interest concept. In the first case, Helvering v.
Bankline Oil Co.,32 the taxpayer operated a casinghead gasoline plant.
Pursuant to contracts with the producer of natural gas, Bankline Oil
Company installed pipelines to transport wet gas from the wellhead to its
plant where it extracted casinghead gasoline from wet gas, paying the
producer thirty three and one-third percent of the proceeds of the sale of
the gasoline so extracted; the dry gas was disposed of in a variety of
ways. The taxpayer claimed percentage depletion on the amount by
which the fair market value of the wet gas at the wellhead exceeded the
price it paid the producer for the gas. The Internal Revenue Service dis-
allowed the claimed depletion, and the Supreme Court agreed. Finding
that Bankline Oil Company had a "mere economic advantage derived
from production, through a contractual relation to the owner," not a
"capital investment in the mineral deposit,"33 the Court concluded that
Banldine Oil Company had not acquired an economic interest. Accord-
ingly, the Court disallowed the claimed depletion allowance.34 The
Court's reasoning emphasized that, apart from the contracts, the tax-
payer was granted no interest in the mineral in place; under the contracts
the taxpayer was merely a processor entitled to delivery at the wellhead,
with no control over production. 5
4. Helvering v. O'Donnell
On the same day Bankline Oil Co. was decided, the Court handed
31. Subsequently, in Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940), the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that a production payment could qualify as an economic interest even though it was payable
in cash, not in kind.
32. 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
33. Id. at 367.
34. Id. at 368.
35. The holding of Bankline Oil Co. now is expressly incorporated into Treas. Reg. § 1.611-
l(b)(1) (as amended in 1973).
[Vol. 27:313
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down Helvering v. O'Donnell.36 In O'Donnell, the taxpayer owned one-
third of the stock of San Gabriel Company, which owned oil and gas
properties. He transferred that stock to Midway Petroleum Company in
exchange for a promise of payments equal to one-third of Midway's net
profits from subsequent operation of the San Gabriel properties. In de-
nying the taxpayer a depletion allowance with respect to payments from
Midway, the Court concluded that the agreement was "a personal cove-
nant and did not purport to grant [the taxpayer] an interest in the
properties themselves."37 If Midway realized no net profits, there would
be no payments. Prior to the exchange, the taxpayer did not have an
investment or interest in the oil and gas properties as a result of his own-
ership of the shares of stock. As a result of the transaction, the taxpayer
had merely obtained an "economic advantage" in exchange for his
shares. He did not have an economic interest.38 O'Donnell is no longer
considered good law, having been overruled, sub silentio, by the sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision in Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v.
Commissioner.9
5. Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Development Co.
In the third 1938 case, Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Development
Co.,' the Supreme Court held that sale treatment was to be accorded to
the conveyance of oil and gas leases, prospecting permits, drilling agree-
ments, and equipment in consideration of five specified installments of
fixed cash amounts, plus one-third of the transferee's net profits from
production and operation, after the transferee had recovered its expendi-
tures for acquisition and development.41 Accordingly, the stipulated
fixed cash payments were found not to be a bonus, and the transferor-
payee was denied percentage depletion on them.
6. Anderson v. Helvering
Two years later, the Supreme Court further restricted the economic
interest concept in Anderson v. Helvering.42 Anderson acquired oil and
gas properties, including fee interests, from the Oklahoma Company in
36. 303 U.S. 370 (1938).
37. Id. at 372.
38. Id.
39. See infra part II.B.8.
40. 303 U.S. 372 (1938).
41. Id. at 375.
42. 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
1992]
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consideration of a $50,000 bonus plus $110,000 payable from one-half of
the proceeds of the oil and gas produced from the property or from a sale
of the fee interest. Anderson excluded payments from production deliv-
ered to the Oklahoma Company from gross income on the theory that
the transferor's production payment was an economic interest under
Thomas v. Perkins.43 The Commissioner argued that the Oklahoma
Company did not have an economic interest because the production pay-
ment was payable in cash, not in kind. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, yet held that an economic interest had not been retained.'
Thus, Anderson was required to include the full proceeds from the sale
of production as income. Thomas v. Perkins was inapposite because the
Oklahoma Company, Anderson's transferor, reserved an interest in the
fee in addition to an interest in the minerals. Reservation of the addi-
tional security destroyed the economic interest because the transferor
could be paid from a sale of the fee interest. Therefore, the Oklahoma
Company could look to a source other than extraction of minerals for a
return of its investment.45 If the transferor was allowed depletion and
was paid from proceeds of the sale of the fee, depletion ultimately would
be allowed with respect to income in excess of the gross proceeds from
extraction, contrary to the holding of Twin Bell Oil Syndicate.46
7. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner
In 1946, the Supreme Court decided two important cases that effec-
tively, although not expressly, overruled O'Donnell4 7 and Elbe Oil Land
Development Co.48 Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner49 dealt with a
taxpayer who held the fee interest in oil and gas properties. He leased
the properties for a bonus, a fractional royalty, and a net profits interest.
The Commissioner conceded that bonus payments and royalty payments
received by the taxpayer were depletable because the taxpayer had an
economic interest, but argued that the net profits interest was a mere
economic advantage as in O'Donnell and Elbe Oil Land Development Co.
The Supreme Court held for the taxpayer, because the net profits pay-
ments "flow[ed] directly from the taxpayers' economic interest in the oil
43. See supra part II.B.2.
44. Anderson, 310 U.S. at 412-13.
45. Id.
46. See supra part II.B.1.
47. See supra part II.B.4.
48. See supra part II.B.5.
49. 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
[Vol. 27:313
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and par[took] of the quality of rent rather than of a sale price."5 The
Court distinguished both O'Donnell and Elbe Oil Land Development Co.
on the basis that O'Donnell involved a taxpayer who was a stranger to
the lease receiving a net profits interest, and Elbe Oil Land Development
Co. involved a net profits interest which was disassociated from an eco-
nomic interest thus not entitling the holder to depletion. These distinc-
tions made the result in Kirby Petroleum Co. appear to turn on the
presence of a royalty interest in addition to the net profits interest.
8. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner
In Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner,"1 decided less than four
months later, the Supreme Court examined the treatment of interests cre-
ated by a sublease where the sole consideration payable to the lessor was
fifty percent of the sublessee's net profits from production. The taxpayer-
sublessee had excluded from gross income the amounts paid to the sub-
lessor on the theory that the sublessor had retained an economic interest.
The Commissioner, however, treated the entire sales proceeds of produc-
tion as income of the sublessee, arguing that a net profits interest was not
an economic interest unless, as in Kirby Petroleum Co., the holder of the
interest also was entitled to a royalty.
The Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's argument and held
that a naked retained net profits interest retained by a lessor or a subles-
sor, was an economic interest, excludable by the holder of the burdened
interest and depletable by the holder of the net profits interest. The
Court stated:
[Tlhe assignor of the petitioner before assignment had an economic
interest in the oil in place through its control over extraction ....
[T]he petitioner looked to the special depletion allowances... to re-
turn whatever capital investment it had. The cost of that investment to
the beneficiary of the depletion... is unimportant. Depletion depends
only upon production. It is the lessor's, lessee's or transferee's "possi-
bility of profit" from the use of his rights over production, "dependent
solely upon the extraction and sale of the oil," which marks an eco-
nomic interest in the oil.52
The Court attempted to distinguish Elbe Oil Land Development Co. 53 as
a case involving a transfer of all interest of the assignor in the properties
50. Id. at 607.
51. 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
52. Id. at 34-35 (citing Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599, 604 (1946)).
53. See supra part I.B.5.
1992]
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by way of "absolute sale" and concluded that Elbe Oil Land Develop-
ment Co. should not be extended. 4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a sepa-
rate opinion, noted that Elbe Oil Land Development Co. was
indistinguishable. The eloquent language of his dissent captures the elu-
siveness of the economic interest concept:
Nothing better illustrates the gossamer lines that have been drawn by
this Court in tax cases than the distinction made in the Court's opinion
between Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Co. . . . and this case. To draw
such distinctions, which hardly can be held in the mind longer than it
takes to state them, does not achieve the attainable certainty that is
such a desideratum in tax matters, nor does it make generally for re-
spect of law.5
5
9. Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co.
Ten years passed before another significant Supreme Court case ap-
plying the economic interest concept was decided. Commissioner v.
Southwest Exploration Co. 56 dealt with a carved-out net profits interest.
Southwest Exploration Company held offshore leases in California. State
law required either whipstock drilling or drilling from filled land and
required evidence of ability to furnish a drilling site as a condition prece-
dent to consideration of bids to lease oil properties from the state. There
were no suitable filled lands from which to develop the deposit on which
Southwest Exploration Company was bidding. However, the Hunting-
ton Beach Company owned ocean-front land, and in order to bid on
leases, which it subsequently obtained, Southwest Exploration granted
Huntington Beach Company twenty-four percent of its net profits from
sale of the oil in exchange for rights to whipstock drill from Huntington
Beach land. The agreement specified that Huntington Beach Company
did not acquire any share in the lease or deposit by virtue of the net
profits payment.
Despite the contract provision expressly limiting Huntington Beach
Company's interest in the lease or lease deposit, the Supreme Court held
that the contractual right to a share of the profits from the extracted oil
carved out of its leasehold interest by Southwest Exploration Company
and granted to Huntington Beach Company, constituted an economic
54. Burton-Sutton Oil Co., 328 U.S. at 36-37.
55. Id. at 38 (citation omitted).
56. 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
[Vol. 27:313
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interest held by Huntington Beach Company." The Court acknowl-
edged that this was the first case in which it found a claimant outside the
chain of title to the fee or lease of the deposit to have economic interest.
But the Court stated, the law deals with "economic realities, not legal
abstractions."58 Without the agreement of the upland owners, Southwest
Exploration Company could not obtain a lease or drill. Huntington
Beach Company made an "indispensable contribution" to the drilling in
exchange for a net profits interest in the mineral deposit.5 9 The proxim-
ity of Huntington Beach Company's land to the oil and gas deposit in
conjunction with state law, made the upland owners "essential parties to
any drilling operations."'  Huntington Beach Company could have sold
the land and realized the enhanced value resulting from its controlling
position with respect to the deposit, but chose instead to exchange the
land for a share of the operating profits. Contribution of the land for
drilling was an "investment" in the deposit; Huntington Beach Com-
pany's income was dependent upon production, and the value of its inter-
est decreased with each barrel of oil produced. In a final paragraph, the
Court attempted to limit its decision to the particular facts, stating that
its decision did not necessarily apply to other "instances of 'strangers
disassociated from the lease' who may have contributed an essential facil-
ity to the drilling operation in return for a share of the net profits."61
The lower courts and the Internal Revenue Service, however, have given
Southwest Exploration Co. an expansive application.62
10. Parsons v. Smith
Most of the preceding cases focused on whether certain nonoperat-
ing interests were economic interests entitling the holder to depletion. In
1959, the Supreme Court first examined the economic interest concept in
the context of operating interests. The issue in Parsons v. Smith63 was
whether contract miners who extracted minerals for the lessee in consid-
eration of a specified dollar amount per ton had obtained an economic
interest under the contract mining agreement. Parsons was a road build-
ing contractor who agreed, under an oral contract, to strip mine coal
owned by Rockhill Coal Company in consideration of a fixed dollar
57. Id. at 316.
58. Id. at 315.
59. Id. at 317.
60. Id. at 316.
61. Id. at 316-17.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95, 116-117.
63. 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
1992]
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amount per ton, subject to adjustment for cost increases.6' Parsons pro-
vided, at his expense, all equipment and labor to remove overburden and
extract the coal. All of the extracted coal was delivered to Rockhill for
sale by Rockhill; Parsons was not entitled to keep any of the coal, and his
right to payment was not conditioned on Rockhill's sale of the coal.
Either party was entitled to terminate the arrangement on ten days' no-
tice, subject to Parson's right to complete extraction of any coal with
respect to which he had removed the overburden. Parsons invested sub-
stantial amounts in movable equipment and operated under the agree-
ment for eight years. When he quit, large amounts of strippable coal
remained.
The Court characterized the rights of the contract miners as a
"mere economic advantage," not an economic interest.65 The contract
miners simply provided the use of equipment and services in exchange
for a fee paid by the mineral owners. Nothing indicated that the contract
miners made any investment in the mineral deposit or that the mineral
owners had transferred any interest to the miners. The miners's claim
that the contract right constituted an investment in the mineral deposit
was dismissed as a legal fiction. The Court summarized its reasoning as
follows:
To recapitulate, the asserted fiction is opposed to the facts (1) that
petitioners' investments were in their equipment, all of which was
movable-not in the coal in place; (2) that their investments in equip-
ment were recoverable through depreciation-not depletion; (3) that
the contracts were completely terminable without cause on short no-
tice; (4) that the landowners did not agree to surrender and did not
actually surrender to petitioners any capital interest in the coal in
place; (5) that the coal at all times, even after it was mined, belonged
entirely to the landowners, and that petitioners could not sell or keep
any of it but were required to deliver all that they mined to the land-
owners; (6) that petitioners were not to have any part of the proceeds
of the sale of the coal, but, on the contrary, they were to be paid a fixed
sum for each ton mined and delivered, which was ... agreed to be in
"full compensation for the full performance of all work and for the
furnishings of all [labor] and equipment required for the work"; and
(7) that petitioners, thus, agreed to look only to the landowners for all
sums to become due them under their contracts. The agreement of the
landowners to pay a fixed sum per ton for mining and delivering the
64. A companion case involved a written contract terminable on thirty day's notice. The con.
tract miner in that case operated under the agreement until most of the strippable coal had been
extracted. Id. at 218-19.
65. Id. at 224.
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coal "was a personal covenant and did not purport to grant [petition-
ers] an interest in the [coal in place]." '66
Nothing in the Court's opinion provided any significant clues regarding
the relative importance of the seven factors.
11. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner
Six years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the result and clarified
the scope and reasoning of Parsons. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner67 dealt with whether contract miners who were engaged in under-
ground mining (drift mining) had an economic interest in the deposit.
Paragon, the lessee of coal properties, entered into oral contracts with
various firms under which contract miners mined coal on Paragon's
property at the miner's expense. All of the contracts were for an indefi-
nite period and did not refer to termination. Paragon was to pay the
miners a fixed fee for each ton of coal delivered. The fee would be varied
to reflect the market price of coal; any changes in the fee were prospec-
tive only. The contract miners did not specifically share in the proceeds
of the coal delivered and sold at the market price. Because the coal was
extracted by drift mining, the contract miners expended substantial time
and money for mine development in driving tunnels.
The Tax Court found that the contracts were terminable at will, and
that all seven Parsons factors were present. Thus, the court denied the
contract miners an economic interest. The court of appeals reversed,
finding that under state law the contract miners had an implied right to
mine to exhaustion.68 The Supreme Court reversed again, agreeing with
the Tax Court that the contracts were terminable at will and that Parsons
controlled.69 The Court held that the contract miners did not have an
economic interest. In explaining its reasoning, the Court shed additional
light on the Parsons factors. Although the Court found the contracts
terminable at will, it went on to state that "[i]n any event the right to
mine to exhaustion, without more, does not constitute an economic inter-
est."70 The determinative factor in Paragon was that the fee received by
contract miners was not directly related to the sales price of the coal that
they mined. The owner was free to sell at any price and retain entire
proceeds in excess of the agreed upon fee, indicating that the contract
66. Id. at 225 (citing Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 370, 372 (1938)).
67. 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
68. Id. at 633-34.
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miners had no interest in the coal in place and did not look to extraction
and sale of the mineral for a return of any investment. The Court stated
that:
Paragon was bound to pay the posted fee regardless of the condition of
the market at the time of the particular delivery and thus the contract
miners did not look to the sale of the coal for a return of their invest-
ment, but looked solely to Paragon to abide by its covenant.71
12. United States v. Swank
As a result of the decisions in Parsons and Paragon Jewel Coal, the
Internal Revenue Service took the position that a lessee under a lease
terminable on short notice did not hold an economic interest in the de-
posit and was not entitled to depletion.72 The Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner's position,7" but the Commissioner's position was rejected
by the Fifth Circuit and Court of Claims.74
The Supreme Court resolved the controversy in favor of the lessees
in its most recent economic interest pronouncement, United States v.
Swank 75 In Swank, the taxpayer leased coal deposits under leases termi-
nable by the lessors without cause on thirty days' prior notice. However,
the lessee-taxpayer actually extracted coal for several years without inter-
ruption. The Internal Revenue Service denied the lessee any depletion
deduction on the grounds that short notice terminability of the lease was
fatal to the claim of an economic interest relying on Parsons and Paragon
Jewel Coal. The government argued that because of the termination
clause, the lessee taxpayer had a mere economic advantage, not an eco-
nomic interest. As a matter of "practical economics," the government
argued, the lessor had the only significant interest in the coal in the
ground.
The Court rejected the government's arguments noting that Swank,
71. Id. at 635. The holdings in Parsons and Paragon Jewel Coal now are incorporated expressly
in Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1973).
72. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B. 204 (holding that a lessee under an oral lease, which
was terminable at will because it did not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds, did not have
an economic interest), revoked by Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99. See generally Martin J. McMa-
hon, Jr., Defining the "Economic Interest" in Minerals After United States v. Swank, 70 KY. L.J. 23,
52-60 (1981-82) [hereinafter McMahon, Defining the "Economic Interest'l.
73. See Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979); Mullins v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 571
(1967), acq. in result, 1970-2 C.B. xx. See Whitmer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971)
for Third Circuit treatment of the issue.
74. See Swank v. United States, 602 F.2d 348 (Ct. Cl. 1979), aff'd, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); Win-
ters Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974); Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States,
485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
75. 451 U.S. 571 (1981).
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unlike Parsons and Paragon Jewel Coal, dealt with whether anyone could
claim depletion, not who could claim it. Parsons and Paragon Jewel Coal
were distinguished on the grounds that short notice terminability of the
agreements was not the determinative factor. Rather, the Court stated
that the key factor in both cases was that the contract miners merely
were to mine the coal for delivery to the owners at a fixed price. The
miners had no rights in the coal before extraction nor rights to sell it or
share in the proceeds of its sale after extraction. Thus, the miners looked
to a personal covenant for their income.
In contrast, the lessee in Swank had a legal interest in the coal both
before and after it was extracted and was free to sell the coal at the mar-
ket price. The Court found no statutory requirement of a minimum du-
ration for the interest. It rejected the government's argument that the
practical economics of the deal assured that the lessor would terminate
the lease if the price of coal rose, thus making the lessee's interest in the
coal too tenuous to justify a depletion allowance. The government's ar-
gument that the lessor could, and presumably would, renegotiate a more
favorable lease if the price of coal rose was not a certainty because other
factors in addition to royalty level influenced whether the lease remained
advantageous. For example, the quantity of coal actually mined by the
lessee was also influential. That the leases were continued over a number
of years despite the increased value of the coal in the ground was cited as
evidence of the Court's conclusion.
Furthermore, the Court concluded it would be unfair to deny deple-
tion to a lessee who in fact had extracted minerals over a long period
merely because he incurred the risk of termination of the lease as a result
of unequal bargaining power.76 Finally, the Court could find no rational
basis for linking depletion with the period of time that the taxpayer oper-
ates a mine. If percentage depletion is sound policy, it is equally sound
whether one taxpayer operates a mine over an extended period or several
taxpayers operate a mine over successive shorter periods.7 7
C. Elaboration of the Theoretical Definition
The lower courts and the Internal Revenue Service have added fur-
ther gloss to the definition of the economic interest concept developed by
the Supreme Court by synthesizing and reconciling some of the apparent
conflicts in the Court's opinions. Furthermore, Congress has intervened
76. Id. at 584-85.
77. See generally MeMahon, Defining the "Economic Interest," supra note 72.
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to alter statutorily the treatment accorded to production payments.78
1. Alternative Source of Payment Rule
Anderson v. Helvering held that if the holder of a nonoperating inter-
est had a source of payment other than from extraction and sale of min-
erals, the interest was not an economic interest.79 This limitation,
developed in Anderson, was applied by the Fifth Circuit in Christie v.
United States"0 to deny an economic interest to the holder of a produc-
tion payment that could have been satisfied either from production or
from salvage of well equipment. The rule proscribing any alternative
source of payment for an economic interest was strictly applied, negating
the existence of an economic interest, even though the burdened property
was already producing at a rate indicating that the production payment
would be paid in full within one or two months."'
On the other hand, in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner,2
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused rigidly to apply the alterna-
tive source of payment rule. Standard Oil Company assigned to Pacific
Northwest Pipeline Company interests in a number of oil and gas lease-
holds that Standard Oil previously had acquired. Originally, Standard
Oil retained a royalty interest in produced gas, subject to a minimum
royalty. Subsequently, the assignment was modified to impose a ceiling
on the total amount due to Standard Oil, thereby converting Standard
Oil's retained interest to a production payment, and to provide that the
reserved production payment was payable not only out of proceeds from
the sale of produced gas, but also from proceeds of any sale of the as-
signed leasehold interest to a third party by Pacific Northwest. Standard
Oil's purpose in modifying the assignment to include the provision for
satisfaction of the production payment from the proceeds of a sale of the
lease specifically was to preclude treatment of its retained interest as an
economic interest, thereby characterizing the assignment as a sale and
entitling it to report the proceeds at the then highly advantageous long
term capital gains rates.
The government contended that the taxpayer had received ordinary
78. See discussion infra part II.C.7.
79. See supra part II.B.6.
80. 436 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1971).
81. Id. at 1220-21.
82. 465 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972).
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income subject to depletion. The court of appeals agreed with the gov-
ernment, citing two reasons for distinguishing Anderson.83 First, unlike
Anderson where the alternative source of payment was a sale of the fee, in
Standard Oil the alternative source of payment was limited to sales pro-
ceeds of the mineral reserves. Second, because the production payment
in Standard Oil was large but was interest free, and numerous exceptions
existed to transfers that would trigger payment (e.g., corporate reorgani-
zations or mergers), it was unlikely that anyone would purchase the
reserves in a transaction that would trigger payment from the alternative
source. Thus, the possibility of payment from the alternative source was
too remote to be considered. Although the court did not rely on the
taxpayer's motive in reaching its conclusion, it is worth noting that the
transaction was fraught with tax avoidance. Originally structured defini-
tively as a lease, the transaction was modified three years later in an ef-
fort to use Anderson as a sword to obtain the capital gains preference.
Application of the alternative source of payment rule to production
payments currently is of diminished importance because section 636 of
the Code now treats most production payments as loans.84 Generally,
even if the transaction fails the economic interest test, a purported pro-
duction payment will be treated as a loan.
Nevertheless, the alternative source of payment rule remains impor-
tant. In certain instances, the alternative source of payment rule may
apply to royalties. Cline v. Commissioner"5 involved a taxpayer who held
overriding royalty interests on coal leases. He exchanged the royalties,
acknowledged as economic interests by the Tax Court, for a royalty in-
terest in all coal processed through the tipple owned by the lessee of the
burdened properties. The Tax Court found that the new royalty was not
an economic interest because payment was not dependent on extraction
of coal from any particular lease. In contrast, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice treats as an economic interest a net profits interest that burdens mul-
tiple properties and is computed with reference to the combined net
income of the properties (i.e., a "basket net profits interest"), even
though such an interrelationship arguably may run afoul of the alterna-
tive source of payment proscription.86
83. Id. at 253.
84. See discussion infra part II.C.7.a.
85. 67 T.C. 889 (1977), aff'd, 617 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1980).
86. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,907 (Oct. 8, 1982); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-43-030 (July 26, 1985).
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2. Overriding Net Profits or Royalty Interest Acquired by
Persons with No Prior Interest in the Deposit
Standing alone, the Supreme Court decisions defining economic in-
terest do not deal definitively with treatment of carved-out royalty and
net profits interests. This is due in part to the Court's attempt to limit
the scope of its decision in Southwest Exploration Co. Recall that in
O'Donnell17 the Supreme Court held that a corporate shareholder who
sold oil company stock in consideration of a profits interest in the com-
pany's oil and gas properties did not acquire an economic interest in the
deposits. The precise rationale for the result was unclear. If the ration-
ale was that a net profits interest is a personal covenant, under which the
holder is not looking to extraction and sale of the minerals for income, it
was overruled, sub silentio, by Burton-Sutton Oil.88 Alternatively, if the
rationale was that the claimant of the economic interest was outside the
chain of title, it was seriously undermined by Southwest Exploration Co. 89
In any event, O'Donnell is largely devoid of precedential value.
Neither the courts nor the Internal Revenue Service now even con-
sider applying O'Donnell to similar fact patterns, and carved-out inter-
ests in minerals - generally are treated as economic interest if they
otherwise qualify. Beach Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner9" involved
the treatment of a carved-out net profits interest in oil and gas properties
that was distributed by the corporation holding the working interest in
the properties. The Commissioner, citing O'Donnell, argued that the
shareholders were not entitled to depletion. The Tax Court rejected the
application of O'Donnell, finding Kirby Petroleum91 and Burton-Sutton
Oil Co. to be controlling. The court concluded that the shareholders had
obtained an economic interest. The key to an economic interest, the
court reasoned, is not any particular form of ownership or any real cash
investment, but only a right to income entirely dependent on production.
Subsequently, in Alexander v. Commissioner,92 the Tax Court held
that a vendor of corporate stock who received an overriding royalty in
exchange had acquired an economic interest, without ever discussing
O'Donnell. In Warren v. United States,93 the Court of Claims reached
87. See supra part II.B.4.
88. See supra part II.B.8.
89. See supra part I.B.9.
90. 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 638 (1946).
91. See supra part II.B.7.
92. 34 T.C. 758 (1960), acq. in result, 1961-1 C.B. 3.
93. 171 F. Supp. 846 (Ct. CI. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 916 (1959).
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the same result with respect to other shareholders involved in the
transaction.
The principles of these lower court cases appear to be well accepted.
In General Counsel Memorandum 38,907 and Private Letter Ruling 85-
43-030, the Internal Revenue Service accepted the holding of Beach Pe-
troleum and extended it to basket net profits interests covering multiple
properties.94 Furthermore, Revenue Ruling 67-118 holds that a donative
transfer to a trust of an overriding royalty carved out of the working
interest by the lessee is a transfer of an economic interest.95
3. Leases Terminable on Short Notice
In Revenue Ruling 83-160, the Internal Revenue Service expanded
the principle of Swank 96 somewhat beyond its precise facts, holding that
the terminability of a mineral lease at the will of the lessor "is not an
essential criterion that, by itself, will preclude a taxpayer from having an
economic interest." 97 Accordingly, the Service revoked four previous
rulings which denied an economic interest to lessees operating under
leases subject to short notice termination.98 Two other rulings were
modified to eliminate the factor that the leases were not terminable on
short notice without cause as a reason that the lessees held an economic
interest.99
One revoked ruling is particularly worth noting. Revenue Ruling
77-341 held that a lessee of a coal deposit in Kentucky under an oral
lease did not have an economic interest because the lease was unenforce-
able under the statute of frauds."° The revocation of this ruling does not
necessarily mean that the Internal Revenue Service now views a lessee
under an oral or otherwise unenforceable lease as having an economic
interest. The Service continues successfully to assert that licensees do
not have an economic interest,101 and a lessee under an unenforceable
lease generally is considered a licensee.102
94. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,907 (Oct. 8, 1982); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-43-030 (July 26, 1985).
95. Rev. Rul. 67-118, 1967-1 C.B. 163.
96. See supra part II.B.12.
97. Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99, 100.
98. Rev. Rul. 74-506, 1974-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179; Rev. Rul. 77-341,
1977-2 C.B. 204; Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205.
99. Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310; Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301.
100. Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B. 204.
101. See Missouri River Sand Co. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 193 (1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 334 (8th
Cir. 1985).
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4. Contract Miners
The Supreme Court clearly stated in Paragon Jewel Coal that con-
tract miners are denied an economic interest primarily because they re-
ceive a fixed fee for extracting the coal rather than relying on a sale at the
market price for their income. 103 Adjusting the fixed price periodically
to reflect labor and other costs or general market price trends does not
change the result. The contract miner still is viewed as earning its profits
from the personal covenant of the mineral owner."
Not all contract miners, however, are denied an economic interest.
A contract miner who receives a percentage of net proceeds from the sale
of extracted minerals may have an economic interest even if the contract
miner never obtains title to the minerals or the right to sell the minerals
for his own account. In Ruston v. Commissioner 105 and Brown v. Com-
missioner, 106 decided prior to Parsons and Paragon Jewel Coal, the Tax
Court held that contract miners who were entitled to a fixed percentage
of the net profits realized by the lessee-mineral owner upon sale of the
extracted minerals had an economic interest in the mineral deposit and
were entitled to the depletion allowance. In both cases the contract
miner had the exclusive right to mine the deposits and the agreement was
not terminable without cause. Thus, Parsons and Paragon Jewel Coal are
distinguishable from Ruston and Brown. Nevertheless, in Utah Alloy
Ores v. Commissioner,107 decided after Parsons, the Tax Court held that a
percentage of sales contract miner did not have an economic interest.
The Internal Revenue Service has announced, however, that on lim-
ited facts it will follow Ruston and Brown, not Utah Alloy Ores. Revenue
Ruling 84-88 reaffirmed that a percentage of sales contract miner may
have an economic interest.o10 The facts of the ruling, however, appear to
103. See supra part I.B.11.
104. See Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624, 628 (1965) (fixed contract
price varied "depending somewhat on the general trend of the market price for the coal over ex-
tended periods and to some extent on labor costs"); Costantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405, 406
(3d Cir. 1971) (contract miner frequently was paid more per ton than contract price); McCall v.
Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699, 700 (4th Cir. 1963) (fixed contract price subject to change as market
price fluctuated); United States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847, 849 (4th Cir. 1959) (fixed contract price
subject to change as market price fluctuated); Adkins v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 957, 966 (1969)
(contract price to be adjusted in comparable ratio to substantial change in general price level), acq. in
result, 1970-1 C.B. xv; Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 528, 547 (1957) (fixed contract
price subject to change if market price of lawful maximum price increased), aff'd in part, rev'd In
part, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959).
105. 19 T.C. 284 (1952).
106. 22 T.C. 58 (1954), acq., 1954-2 C.B. 3.
107. 33 T.C. 917 (1960).
108. Rev. Rul. 84-88, 1984-1 C.B. 141.
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be intended to limit its application. Not only does the ruling emphasize
that the contract miner had the exclusive right to extract the mineral for
sale by the owner, but, in contrast to the treatment of lessees in Revenue
Ruling 83-160,109 also specifically states that the contract miner had the
right to mine the deposit to exhaustion. On the other hand, the Service
appears to have been generous to the contract miner by holding that the
presence of a guaranteed minimum payment from the mineral owner did
not negate the economic interest under the alternative source of payment
rule.110 Clearly there existed at least a theoretical possibility that the
contract miner could be paid more than one-hundred percent of the sales
price of the extracted mineral. Why the possibility that the contract
miner could be paid more than the sales price of the mineral does not
violate the alternative source of payment rule is a mystery.
Although the Internal Revenue Service has not stated clearly that it
does not consider Swank 111 applicable to contract miners, every indica-
tion is that the Service takes this position. Notwithstanding the ambigu-
ity of the Service's position on this point, there is a possibility that a
percentage of sales contract miner with a contract term of one year or
more arguably may have an economic interest. Prior to Parsons, the In-
ternal Revenue Service took the position that even a fixed fee contract
miner with a contractual right to mine the deposit for one year or more
had obtained an economic interest from the mineral owner.11 In light of
Swank and Revenue Ruling 83-160, it is possible that the Internal Reve-
nue Service and the courts might consider reviving this standard in the
future. Because the question in contract mining cases is who claims de-
pletion, not the amount of income from the property subject to depletion,
any such change should be prospective only.1 13
5. Licensees
Except in rare circumstances, licensees generally are found not to
have acquired an economic interest in a mineral deposit by virtue of the
license to extract. Lack of a formal interest or enforceable exclusive
rights to the mineral in the ground is considered to be fatal to the claim.
In Holbrook v. Commissioner,114 the Tax Court held that a taxpayer
109. Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99.
110. Rev. Rul. 84-88, 1984-1 C.B. 141.
111. See supra part II.B.12.
112. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 26,290, 1950-1 C.B. 42, 45-46.
113. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Coal Depletion Allowance Deduction, 85 W. VA.
L. REv. 581, 593-605 (1983) [hereinafter McMahon, Coal Depletion].
114. 65 T.C. 415 (1975).
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holding a nonexclusive, nontransferable license to extract coal, subject to
termination on ten days' notice, was not entitled to claim percentage de-
pletion. The licensee's freedom to sell the coal on his behalf, acquisition
of title on extraction, expenditure of time and money in developing the
underground mine, and operation under the license for four years, were
considered insufficient to confer an economic interest.115 Despite the li-
censee's operation of a deposit for several years, the inherently nonexclu-
sive and terminable nature of a license generally is found to preclude a
licensee from acquiring an economic interest.
In contrast, relying on Southwest Exploration Co.,16 in two cases
the Tax Court has found that a licensee effectively holding the sole ability
to exploit a deposit acquired an economic interest in the deposit even
without possessing an exclusive legal right to extract the deposit.117 The
cases involved sand and gravel dredging where the taxpayer owned the
only riparian land allowing access to the desired sand and gravel depos-
its. Exclusive physical access coupled with the license sufficed to give
rise to an economic interest.
Neither the Internal Revenue Service nor the courts appear to have
reconsidered their general treatment of licensees in light of Swank and
Revenue Ruling 83-160. Since 1983, the Internal Revenue Service has
successfully denied percentage depletion to licensees operating under
nonexclusive licenses. 1 8 However, the policy based analysis of the
Supreme Court in Swank, allowing percentage depletion to lessee's under
short-notice termination leases, indicates that there may be some reason
critically to reexamine the disallowance of percentage depletion to licen-
sees because their rights are not exclusive. The Supreme Court empha-
sized the incentive aspect of depletion, not its cost recovery aspect, in
holding that terminability of a lease on short notice did not preclude an
economic interest. Because percentage depletion serves an incentive pur-
pose, not an income measurement purpose, the Court saw no reason why
the availability of the allowance should depend on whether one lessee
mined over a long period or several lessees extracted the minerals over
115. I d; accord, Rissler & McMurry Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1973) (oral
license to remove sand and gravel from gravel pit), aff'g 342 F. Supp. 43 (D. Wyo. 1972).
116. See supra part II.B.9.
117. See Victory Sand & Concrete, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 407 (1974), acq. in result,
1976-2 C.B. 3; Oil City Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 31 (1959), nonacq., 1965-1 C.B.
5; see also Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979).
118. Missouri River Sand Co. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 193 (1984) (licensee extracting gravel
from river under nonexclusive license), aff'd, 774 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1985); Missouri Pacific Corp. v.
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successive shorter periods, thus weakening the exclusivity require-
ment.119 Furthermore, the Court distinguished its earlier cases denying
contract miners an economic interest on the grounds that those cases
involved allocating the depletion allowance among the various parties
with an interest in the deposit, whereas Swank involved an instance
where one could claim depletion on the operator's gross income from
mining if the lessee-operator was denied the allowance. 120
As did its position in Swank, the Internal Revenue Service's position
with respect to licensees limits the total income on which depletion is
allowed to the royalties paid to the deposit owner; the holder of the
working interest is denied any depletion. Licenses now present the only'
initance in which this situation results.12 1
Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Service has not consistently ap-
plied the exclusivity requirement that it employs to deny licensees an
economic interest. Revenue Ruling 70-499 held that lessees under a
"joint and several" lease possessed an economic interest where the lease
was "exclusive" with respect to nonlessees, even though the lessees oper-
ated independently, enjoyed no exclusive rights among themselves, and
were not entitled to any minimum portion of the deposit. 12 Neverthe-
less, there may be some historical basis for requiring exclusivity of rights
as a prerequisite for an economic interest. Percentage depletion was first
introduced as an administratively convenient substitute for discovery
value depletion. 23 Under discovery value depletion, which served the
same incentive function as percentage depletion, exclusivity of rights to
the deposit could have been viewed as necessary; it would have been im-
possible to compute the depletion allowance in the absence of exclusive
rights because there would have been no clearly fixed amount of the de-
posit over which the operating licensee could allocate the value of the
deposit to arrive at a dollar per unit depletion rate.2 4
6. Operating Agreements with Foreign Governments
Arrangements permitting an American company to extract mineral
deposits in another country are not always easily analyzed under the
119. United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 585 (1981).
120. Id. at 583.
121. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Licensees and Economic Interest in Minerals After
Swank and Revenue Ruling 83-160, 72 Ky. L.J. 787 (1983-84).
122. Rev. Rul. 70-499, 1970-2 C.B. 132.
123. See McMahon, Defining the "Economic Interest, " supra note 72, at 30-33.
124. See id. For the cost depletion formula, of which discovery depletion was a variant, see
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a) (as amended in 1972).
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traditional economic interest test. The traditional test may be difficult to
apply in this context because the foreign government may retain all
forms of technical ownership of the mineral until it is produced. Such a
problem was presented in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner.2 ' In Gulf, the
issue was whether Gulf Oil Corporation had an economic interest in oil
and gas deposits in Iran under a 1973 agreement with Iran and the Na-
tional Iranian Oil Corporation (NIOC).
In 1954, a consortium of oil companies, including Gulf, entered into
an agreement with NIOC under which an operating company funded by
the consortium produced crude oil on behalf of Iran, which retained title
to the oil in place. Trading company subsidiaries of the consortium
members purchased crude oil from NIOC at the wellhead at a price
equal to twelve and one-half percent of the posted price. Oil and gas
retained by NIOC for Iranian domestic use was refined by another oper-
ating company capitalized by the consortium. The trading companies
funded all assets and facilities used for operations and reimbursed the
operating companies for the expenses of exploration, development, and
operations; NIOC paid expenses and fees for production and refining for
Iranian domestic consumption. Because the Internal Revenue Service
concluded that the arrangement hqd "all the essential characteristics of a
lease," it ruled that under the agreement Gulf held an economic interest
in the minerals in place.
In 1973, the original agreement was replaced by a new agreement
under which a joint stock company formed by the consortium, but
funded by NIOC, replaced the operating companies. The joint stock
company drilled and produced oil under NIOC's direction. The trading
companies annually advanced a specified percentage of NIOC's budgeted
operating expenditures. These advances were amortized over ten years
as a set-off against payments due to NIOC. NIOC and the trading com-
panies annually agreed on the amount of crude oil that would be pro-
duced. Production in excess of Iran's needs was purchased by the
trading companies. If production was insufficient, the trading companies
received less. NIOC received a wellhead price equal to the sum of its
extraction costs, twelve and one-half percent of the applicable posted
price, and certain additional amounts. In addition to the set-off for ad-
vances, the trading companies set off the unrecovered 1973 book value of
the operating companies' assets. The Internal Revenue Service asserted
that under the 1973 agreement Gulf and other consortium members had
125. 86 T.C. 115 (1986), aff'd, 914 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1990).
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a mere economic advantage, not an economic interest, and disallowed
Gulf's claim for percentage depletion and certain foreign tax credits.
The Tax Court concluded that Gulf held an economic interest under
the 1973 agreement. Prefacing its analysis with the statement that "[t]he
[economic interest] test under [the regulations] requires first that there be
an 'investment,' which requires that the payments must be in exchange
for the receipt of minerals and that there must also be an investment in
the production,"126 the court continued by acknowledging that legal title
is not necessary. According to the court, "The 'investment' test requires
only an economic commitment to look to production of the mineral for
income." '27 Ultimately, the standard employed by the court required "a
clear capital interest in the mineral which diminishes as the mineral is
extracted, and [that] the taxpayer must share directly in the economic
productivity of the minerals and the market risk upon sale of the
minerals." 128
On appeal, the Tax Court's decision was affirmed, but the reasoning
of the court of appeals differed from that of the Tax Court.1 29 The court
of appeals purported to apply the two part test for an economic interest
found in Treasury Regulation, section 1.611-1(b), but appears in fact to
have fashioned its own somewhat amorphous test that is in part inconsis-
tent with Swank. 3 Under the first prong of the economic interest test,
the court analyzed whether Gulf had "acquired, by investment, any in-
terest in the oil in place." '131 First, the court acknowledged that the
absence of legal title to the mineral in place did not preclude an economic
interest. Then, after stating that the "factors" employed in cases such as
Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner,1 32 Parsons v. Smith,133 and
Freede v. Commissioner13 "are simply considerations that we may ex-
amine in determining the existence of an economic interest in a particular
case,"' 35 the court applied what it characterized as the "Paragon Jewel
Coal Company factors," which actually are the Parsons evidentiary con-
siderations, as determinative. Apparently without appreciating the con-
flict with Swank, the court noted that the most important factor was
126. Gulf Oil Corp., 86 T.C. at 133.
127. Id. at 134 (citing Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956)).
128. Id. (citing Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979)).
129. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1990).
130. Id. at 418.
131. Id. (quoting Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933)).
132. See supra part II.B.11.
133. See supra part II.B.10.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 196-208.
135. Gulf Oil Corp., 914 F.2d at 419.
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whether the taxpayer had the right to exhaust the mineral deposit or
whether the taxpayer's rights were terminable.
136
According to the court, the first negative factor, "the miner's invest-
ments were in movable equipment rather than in the coal in place,"' 137
was not present in Gulf because the taxpayer and the other consortium
members had invested substantial capital in immovable Iranian plant and
facilities that had not been fully depreciated. Thus, the first factor did
not disqualify Gulf from holding an economic interest. Next, without
clearly stating which Paragon Jewel Coal factor it was applying, the court
stated that, because the consortium members held the exclusive right to
sell the produced oil through the trading companies, the members clearly
had a right to share in the produced oil. Presumably, this conclusion
overcame the fifth, sixth, and seventh Paragon Jewel Coal negative fac-
tors, namely:
(5) the landowners owned the coal at all times, even after it was
mined, precluding the miners from keeping or selling any of it; (6) the
landowners retained all proceeds from the sale of the coal; and (7) the
miners could look only to the landowners for all sums due under their
contracts. 13
8
Finishing its application of the Paragon Jewel Coal factors, the court ob-
served that the contract was long term, lasting twenty years, not termina-
ble-at-will.
The Commissioner's argument that the first prong of the test of the
Regulation was not met, because under Bankline Oil Co. 139 Gulf had a
mere economic advantage with respect to the deposit, was rejected. The
court's conclusion was grounded on Gulf's unrecovered investment in
plant assets and facilities as well as the trial court's finding that Gulf
"had made and was continuing to make investments in the production of
minerals."14°
The second prong of the economic interest test requires that the tax-
payer "secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from
the extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a return of his capi-
tal." 141 The court concluded that this prong was satisfied because Gulf's
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 225 (1959)).
139. See supra part II.B.3.
140. Gulf Oil Corp., 914 F.2d at 420.
141. Id. at 418 (quoting Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933)).
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"profits [were] made by way of purchase at the wellhead, which de-
pended on extraction of the oil."142 Because the trading companies could
set off against payments due to NIOC the operating companies' unrecov-
ered cost of plant and equipment, the court concluded that under South-
west Exploration Co.,143 Gulf had an economic commitment to look to
the production of oil for a return of its investment.
The court of appeals' opinion is confusing for two reasons. First,
the court treated Gulf's investment in immovable equipment as a posi-
tive factor. Numerous judicial decisions, including Paragon Jewel Coal,
establish that the proper question is not whether the taxpayer has in-
vested in immovable property, but whether the taxpayer invested in min-
erals. An investment in depreciable production facilities does not give
rise to an economic interest in the mineral deposit. 1" Second, the con-
clusion that Gulf's "profits [were] made by way of purchase at the well-
head, which depended on extraction of the oil," does not establish that
Gulf's profits were from extraction and sale in the sense required by
Treasury Regulation, section 1.611-1(b). Purchasers who cannot earn a
profit "but for" extraction, such as a utility company having a long term
output contract with a mineral owner, or a gas purchaser under a take-
or-pay contract, generally are not considered to have an economic inter-
est.14 Alternatively, if the court meant that Gulf's profits were derived
by a bargain purchase at the wellhead, Bankline Oil Co. is directly con-
trary precedent notwithstanding that the court did not find it so. The
facts of Bankline Oil Co. clearly reveal that Bankline Oil Company
purchased gas at the wellhead for a bargain price. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held that the company did not hold an economic interest
and denied it the right to claim percentage depletion on the income at-
tributable to the bargain purchase. 146
Even though Bankline Oil Co. supports the argument that Gulf did
142. Id. at 420.
143. See supra part II.B.9.
144. See, eg., Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624, 628 (1965) (tipple, power
line, and railroad siding); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930, 939 (3d Cir. 1959) (build-
ings). But see Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 348 F.2d 921 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (holding
that a depreciable plant involved economic interest when constructed to process minerals purchased
from owner; without construction of plant near deposit it would not have been economically feasible
to extract minerals).
145. See Freede v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1988) (purchaser under take-or-pay
contract), rev'g 86 T.C. 327 (1986), cert denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989); Douglas Coal Co. v. United
States, 429 F. Supp. 322, 338-39 (N.D. W.Va. 1977) (utility with supply contract); Rev. Rul. 80-48,
1980-1 C.B. 99 (purchaser under take-or-pay contract).
146. Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 369 (1983).
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not acquire an economic interest in the deposit under the 1973 agree-
ment, the result in Gu/f nevertheless is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Swank 147 allowing percentage depletion to a lessee
under a lease terminable on short notice. Focusing on the policy basis
for percentage depletion, encouraging production of minerals, Swank es-
chewed reliance upon the technical definition of an economic interest in
favor of an analysis based primarily on whether the taxpayer shared in
the proceeds from extraction and sale as an entrepreneur. Under the
policy based analysis of Swank, Gulf should have had an economic inter-
est because it made a substantial financial commitment to production,
received from the owner of the deposit the right to acquire produced
crude oil at a bargain price, and was entitled to resell that oil in the first
open market sale.
This conclusion, reached by applying Swank, finds some support in
Revenue Ruling 7 3- 4 70 ,14s in which the Internal Revenue Service found
that an oil company prohibited by law from obtaining legal title to either
the mineral deposit in the ground or produced hydrocarbons nevertheless
had obtained an economic interest in the mineral deposit. Under an
agreement with a foreign country, the oil company at its own risk pro-
vided necessary funds for exploration, development, and production of
oil and gas. All produced oil and gas was to be delivered to the foreign
government, which paid the oil company the competitive world market
price. The agreement was subject to termination by the foreign govern-
ment at any time, but if the government terminated the agreement, it was
obligated to pay the oil company an amount equal to the company's con-
tractual share of the value of the remaining reserves. Because the oil
company bore the risk that its advances for exploration and development
would not be recouped except out of production, the Service found that
the oil company held an economic interest.1 49
7. Production Payments
a. Treatment
Historically, under Thomas v. Perkins, a production payment was an
economic interest in the mineral deposit and the holder realized ordinary
income subject to depletion upon receipt of payments.150 Concomitantly,
147. See supra part II.B.12.
148. Rev. Rul. 73-470, 1973-2 C.B. 88.
149. Id at 89.
150. See supra part II.B.2.
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the owner of the burdened mineral interest could exclude the production
payment from gross income under section 61 of the Code or claim a de-
duction for amounts paid to the holder. This basic rule largely has been
supplanted by section 636 of the Code,' which was enacted in 1969 to
counteract perceived tax avoidance spawned by treating production pay-
ments as economic interests in mineral deposits rather than as loans.
Section 636 of the Code treats production payments differently de-
pending on the nature of the transaction in which the production pay-
ment was created. Both carved-out production payments"5 2 under
section 636(a), and production payments retained in a conveyance in
which the holder retains no other economic interest under section 636(b),
are treated as mortgage loans.15 3 An exception is provided for carved-
out production payments if the proceeds are pledged to exploration or
development of the property. Where the exception is met, the produc-
tion payment continues to be treated as an economic interest, entitling
the holder to depletion and the owner of the burdened property to ex-
clude the payment from income. 54
Because section 636 of the Code generally treats a carved-out pro-
duction payment as a mortgage loan from the buyer to the seller, the
holder realizes ordinary income only to the extent of the interest compo-
nent of payments received. In computing the interest component of each
payment in liquidation of the production payment, the original issue dis-
count rules or unstated interest rules of sections 1272 through 1275'1" or
section 483156 respectively, must be taken into account to the extent ap-
plicable. The holder does not claim depletion. Consonantly, the owner
of the burdened interest (the payor) includes the full payment in gross
income but deducts the interest element, 57 subject to any applicable lim-
itations on interest deductions.' 5 8
A carved-out production payment pledged to exploration or devel-
opment is an economic interest and the holder realizes ordinary income
151. I.R.C. § 636 (1988).
152. For examples of carved-out production payments, see Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(a)(3) Ex. 1
(1973) and Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
153. See supra part II.B.2 for discussion of prior law. See also Martin J. McMahon, Jr., A
Production Payment Primer, 4 NAT. RESOURCES TAx Rav. 331 (1991) [hereinafter McMahon, Pro-
duction Primer].
154. See Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(a)-(b).
155. I.R.C. §§ 1272-1275 (West Supp. 1991).
156. Id. § 483 (1988).
157. See Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(a)(1), (3) Ex. 1.
158. For example, passive activity loss rules act as limitations on interest deductions. I.R.C.
§ 469 (West Supp. 1991).
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subject to depletion. 159 Where the production payment has been ac-
quired for cash, rather than by providing services, cost depletion invaria-
bly will be claimed."6 If the production payment was received in
consideration of services for exploration or development, under the pool
of capital doctrine the holder does not realize any income upon receipt of
the right to the production payment. 6 1 Thus, the holder will not have
any basis or will have a very low basis. Upon receipt of payments, the
holder will realize ordinary income and claim percentage depletion. Ac-
cordingly, the owner of the burdened property (the payor) excludes the
production payment from gross income, and may not deduct expenses
funded by the proceeds from the sale of the payment.162
The distinction between exploration and development activities and
production activities is crucial in applying section 636(a). Carved-out
production payments to finance production activities are treated as mort-
gage loans. 163 In Revenue Ruling 74-549,164 the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice held that .a carved-out production payment sold to finance
production stage removal of overburden to increase mine efficiency, but
which benefitted only minerals directly underlying removed overburden,
was not sold to finance development. Accordingly the carved-out pro-
duction payment was not within the exception to mortgage loan treat-
ment in section 636(a).
Although removal of large quantities of overburden benefitting the
deposit generally is considered a development activity under section 616
of the Code,165 only depreciation on the equipment is a development ex-
pense, not its acquisition cost.' 66 Prior to the enactment of section 636,
however, carved-out production payments used to finance the acquisition
of development equipment qualified as economic interests. Under the
pool of capital doctrine the carved-out production payment did not give
159. See Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(b).
160. Under Rev. Rul. 65-10, 1965-1 C.B. 254, the holder of a production payment may elect
between alternative methods of computing the depletion unit for cost depletion.
161. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730, 1941-1 C.B. 214. See generally William M. Linden, Income
Realization in Mineral Sharing Transactions: The Pool of Capital Doctrine, 33 TAX LAW. 115
(1979); Emily A. Parker, Contribution of Services to the Pool of Capital: General Counsel Memoran-
dum 22,730 to Revenue Ruling 83-46, 35 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 313 (1984).
162. See Anderson v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1971).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(b).
164. Rev. Rul. 74-549, 1974-2 C.B. 186.
165. See Rev. Rul. 86-83, 1986-1 C.B. 251 (finding that removal of overburden making minerals
accessible over long period of time was development cost).
166. Treas. Reg. § 1.616-1(b)(2).
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rise to income for either the transferor or transferee. 16 7 If this rule sur-
vived the enactment of section 636, a carved-out production payment,
the proceeds of which are pledged to acquisition of development equip-
ment, would qualify for treatment under the exception to section 636(a).
However, the language of Treasury Regulation, section 1.636-1(b), can
be read to prescribe a more restrictive definition of exploration and devel-
opment under which carved-out production payments that finance the
acquisition of equipment are treated as mortgage loans. 168 Accordingly,
Revenue Ruling 74-549 held that a production payment sold to finance
the acquisition of depreciable equipment used to remove overburden in
the development stage of a mine, was not carved-out for development
and thus was treated as a mortgage loan. 169
The decision in James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner171
illustrates the difference between development and production with re-
spect to oil and gas. In Lewis, the court held that services provided to
implement a waterflood secondary recovery program constituted produc-
tion activity, not development activity. 17 1
Section 636(b) treats a production payment retained in a sale of a
mineral property, when the transferor retains only the production pay-
ment and no royalty or net profits interest, as a purchase money mort-
gage loan. Thus, the holder is treated as having no economic interest in
the deposit. Instead, the holder is treated in much the same manner as
the holder of a carved-out production payment. However, because the
retained production payment arose from a sale or exchange of property,
the holder recognizes gain upon receipt of the right to the payment. In-
stallment reporting under section 453 of the Code may be available to
defer recognition of gain, if the sale qualifies. 72 As with carved-out pro-
duction payments, the original issue discount and unstated interest rules
must be taken into account in determining the extent to which the stated
payments are principal or interest.
Section 636(c) treats a production payment retained in a lease as a
bonus payable in installments. This rule applies where, in addition to the
production payment, the transferor retains a fractional, percentage, or
fixed sum per unit royalty or a net profits interest. Under section 636(c),
167. See Anderson v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1971).
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(b).
169. Rev. Rul. 74-549, 1974-2 C.B. 186. Contra Mapco, Inc. v. United States, No. 84-C-256-E
(N.D. Okla. March 17, 1987).
170. 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964).
171. Id. at 710.
172. I.R.C. § 453 (West Supp. 1991).
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the lessor realizes ordinary income subject to depletion as payments are
received. 173 The lessee may not exclude the payments from gross income
under section 61, or deduct the payments, but must capitalize the full
amount of the production payment into depletable basis. 174 Neverthe-
less, the lessee must exclude the amount of the production payment from
gross income from the property under section 613 of the Code in com-
puting percentage depletion for the year of extraction of the minerals to
which the bonus payments relate.1 75
b. Definition
(1) Generally
In capsule form, Treasury Regulation, section 1.636-3(a), defines the
term "production payment" as a right to a share of minerals or proceeds
from the sale of the minerals produced from a property meeting the defi-
nition of an economic interest, but which has "an expected economic life
(at the time of its creation) of shorter duration than the economic life of
one or more of the mineral properties burdened thereby."' 176 Production
payments may be expressed in terms of a dollar amount of the proceeds
from the sale of extracted minerals or a specified quantity of minerals to
which the holder is entitled. Production payments frequently are de-
scribed in terms of a royalty that is extinguished after a specific amount,
often including additional interest on the principal amount, has been
paid. However, if an ordinary and prudent person dealing in mineral
properties could not reasonably expect, at the time the production pay-
ment was created, that it would be paid off before the economic life of the
burdened mineral property or termination of the lease, or the taxpayer
himself does not have such a belief, the interest will be treated as a roy-
alty, not a production payment.1 77
The requirement that the interest be expected to terminate prior to
exhaustion of the deposit in order to qualify as a production payment
173. Note, however, that in the case of an oil and gas lease, § 613A(d)(5) of the Code prescribes
percentage depletion but not cost depletion for bonuses, and in some cases, § 631(c) of the Code
prescribes § 1231 treatment of gains, supplanting ordinary income subject to depletion, with respect
to lessors of coal or domestic iron ore.
174. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(3) (as amended in 1977).
175. I.R.C. § 613 (West Supp. 1991); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii) (as amended in 1977); Rev.
Rul. 79-73, 1979-1 C.B. 218.
176. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3(a) (1973).
177. United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1963); Yates v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.
1215 (1989), aff'd, 924 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1991); Watnick v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 326 (1988).
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presents problems in creating production payments with respect to non-
producing properties. If the property is in the exploration or develop-
ment stage, it may be difficult to predict the economic life of the deposit.
Revenue Ruling 86-119178 held that if an investor advances money to an
oil and gas operator in consideration of the right to receive from produc-
tion the lesser of twice the amount advanced or a specified percentage of
the net proceeds from the sale of produced hydrocarbons, and the only
indication that hydrocarbons will be produced from the property is
favorable geological and geophysical reports, the interest obtained will be
a royalty and not a production payment. The ruling distinguished
United States v. Foster,179 in which the court found that an interest in a
nonproducing property could be a production payment. In Foster, pro-
duction from an adjacent tract indicated both that there would be pro-
duction from the burdened property and that the expected life of the
production payment was less than the expected producing life of the bur-
dened property.1 80
Yates v. Commissioner' dealt with a careful attempt to create a
production payment burdening wildcat oil and gas properties. The tax-
payer acquired oil and gas leases in a federal lottery and assigned the
leases to an operator for substantial cash payments totalling $675,000
plus a production payment in the form of an overriding royalty equal to
five percent of the proceeds from production "until such time as esti-
mated recoverable reserves... are 10% or less." On the theory that the
right to the $675,000 was a production payment reserved in a sale subject
to section 636(b), the taxpayer reported gain realized on the transaction
as capital gain in an installment sale. The Commissioner asserted that
the transaction was a lease and that the fixed sum payments were lease
bonuses, reportable as ordinary income subject to depletion.
In the Tax Court, the taxpayer argued that the retained interest
should not be classified as a royalty because the terms of the production
payment required that it terminate when ten percent of original reserves
remained, thus assuring that the interest inherently met the definition of
a production payment in Treasury Regulation, section 1.636-3(a)(1).
The Commissioner argued that under United States v. Morgan 1'82 and
178. Rev. Rul. 86-119, 1986-2 C.B. 81.
179. 324 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1963).
180. Id. at 709.
181. 92 T.C. 1215 (1989), aff'd, 924 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1991).
182. 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Watnick v. Commissioner"8 3 the retained interest could not qualify as a
production payment. Any well drilled on the property would be an ex-
ploratory "wildcat" well and the most probable duration of production
from a "wildcat" well is zero. Because there is no expectation of produc-
tion from a "wildcat" well, the life of the retained interest and the lease
are coextensive.
The Tax Court restated the issue as whether there was a reasonable
prospect that the retained share of proceeds from the oil produced from
the subject properties, up to the time that ninety percent of the recover-
able reserves had been extracted, would in substance be paid out prior to
extraction of one-hundred percent of recoverable reserves. After finding
as a matter of fact that there was only a one in five likelihood of ob-
taining any production from the burdened property, the Tax Court con-
cluded that such a probability of production "cannot fairly be
characterized as an expectation that the difference between 100 percent
and 90 percent of future production would be cognizable."' 84 Thus the
interest was a royalty and the transaction was a lease, not a sale.
On essentially the same reasoning, the court of appeals affirmed the
Tax Court's decision, adding a few embellishments. 185 The court of ap-
peals concluded that the language of Treasury Regulation, section 1.636-
3(a), requires that a production payment "possess 'an expected economic
life'," and that "[tihe use of the word 'expected' as used in the regulation
neither connotes nor means a mere possibility of production. Some rea-
sonable degree of certainty, but less than absolute, is thus required."'18 6
After examining the relevant circumstances, such as available geologic
and seismic data, costs of exploration and drilling, the price of oil and
transportation, the probable pay-out, the price received by the taxpayer,
and the proximity of production, the court of appeals concluded that the
Tax Court's finding was not erroneous. 1 7 In rebuttal to the taxpayer's
argument that under the court's analysis a production payment never
could be created to burden a non-producing property, the court stated,
"There can be little doubt that a taxpayer who attempts to create a 'pro-
duction payment' from a non-developed property bears a difficult burden
of persuasion; however, it is not an impossible burden."'8 8
183. 90 T.C. 326 (1988); see supra text accompanying note 177.
184. Yates, 92 T.C. at 1229.
185. Yates v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 1991).
186. Id. at 970.
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Application of Yates as a precedent is not universally government
favorable. The result in Yates may produce more favorable tax treatment
for Yates' assignee than would the characterization for which Yates ar-
gued. Since the transaction was a lease, not a purchase, payments on the
overriding royalty are excludable or deductible by the lessee, rather than
a capital expenditure added to the basis of the deposit. The fixed-sum
cash installments, however, still must be capitalized under Treasury Reg-
ulation, section 1.612-3(a)(3), as a bonus.
(2) Blanket Production Payments
Treasury Regulation, section 1.636-3(a)(1), provides that a produc-
tion payment may burden more than one property. This provision can-
not be read too broadly, however. Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. United
States' 9 held that if two or more production payments are "cross-guar-
anteed" with successive payouts, the production payments will not be
treated as an economic interest because the alternative source of payment
rule has been violated.190 The Internal Revenue Service, however, treats
a production payment that burdens all deposits underlying a single tract,
which are multiple properties under section 614 of the Code,19 1 but were
not multiple properties when General Counsel Memorandum 22,730192
was promulgated, to qualify as an economic interest.193 But if the pro-
duction payment burdens more than one tract or parcel, then it is not an
economic interest and cannot qualify for the exception. 194 In cases where
the holder of the operating interest is seeking to avoid the exception, in
order to deduct expenses paid with funds acquired by the sale of the
production payment, this last stated rule may be taxpayer advantageous.
(3) Take-or-Pay Contracts
The Internal Revenue Service maintains that excess payments by a
purchaser under a take-or-pay contract, entitling the payor to recoup-
ment out of future production of the mineral, typically gas, do not create
a carved-out production payment that will be treated as a mortgage loan.
Instead, the Service treats payments under take-or-pay contracts as
189. 433 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
190. Id. at 642.
191. I.R.C. § 614 (West Supp. 1991).
192. Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730, 1941-1 C.B. 214.
193. Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,478 (Jan. 3, 1963) (holding that a blanket production payment is a
single economic interest).
194. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,663 (March 26, 1976).
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amounts received pursuant to a contract under which the pipeline com-
pany purchases minerals upon production. Thus, it treats the seller as
receiving ordinary income subject to depletion in the year payment under
the take-or-pay contract is received.1 95
The Internal Revenue Service's position has met with mixed success
in litigation. In Freede v. Commissioner, 196 the taxpayer was the owner
of a working interest in a gas property who received advance payments
from a gas pipeline company pursuant to a take-or-pay contract. If pay-
ments exceeded the amount attributable to gas taken in the year, the
pipeline company was entitled to an offset for gas taken in future years in
excess of the amount of gas attributable to the minimum payment in the
future year. The pipeline company had no other right to recoup excess
payments. Freede treated the amounts received in excess of payments for
gas taken as nontaxable mortgage loan proceeds received from the gas
pipeline company as a lender. In a reviewed opinion, the Tax Court up-
held Freede's treatment of receipt of the funds as a loan under section
636(a). The court concluded that by virtue of the payments in excess of
the gas taken, which entitled the pipeline company upon future produc-
tion to take gas without further payment, the payor-gas pipeline com-
pany made an investment in the minerals in place that could be recovered
only through production.1 97 In addition, the Tax Court concluded that
the contract gave the pipeline company a right to compel production
from which it could recoup its advance payments. Accordingly, the
pipeline company had acquired an economic interest, and since the pipe-
line company's rights were limited to a specified volume of gas that was
less than the remaining reserves, it had acquired a carved-out production
payment subject to the general rule of section 636(a).
The decision for the taxpayer was reversed on appeal.198 In apply-
ing the two part test of Palmer v. Bender 99 and Treasury Regulation,
section 1.611-1(b)(1), the Tenth Circuit attempted to enumerate factors
that bear upon whether the taxpayer possesses an "interest... in the
minerals in place" under the first part of the test.2" The factors used by
the court, which unlike the Parsons201 factors are positive factors, were:
(1) the degree of the claimant's legal interest in the minerals; (2) whether
195. Rev. Rul. 80-48, 1980-1 C.B. 99.
196. 86 T.C. 340 (1986), rev'd, 864 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1988).
197. Id. at 350.
198. Freede v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1988).
199. See supra part II.A.1.
200. Freede, 864 F.2d at 673-74.
201. See supra part II.B.10.
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the claimant has significant control over the deposit; (3) the extent of the
claimant's contribution to development or operation; (4) whether the
claimant bears a risk of loss with respect to the deposit; and (5) whether
the claimant's interest is depleted as the mineral is extracted. Neither the
presence nor absence of any one factor, the court stated, was
determinative. 2
Examining the facts to determine whether the pipeline company had
an interest in the minerals in place, the court found that the company
met only the second and fourth factors. The company had acquired
some significant control over the deposit and it bore a risk of loss. For
example, the company could not recoup its investment if production
ceased because of inadequate pressure. Rather than determining whether
this was sufficient to meet the first half of the test, however, the court of
appeals ducked the issue and proceeded to find that the pipeline company
failed the second half of the test for an economic interest. The court's
reasoning on this point is a bit confusing. It concluded that the pipeline
company failed the second half of the test because the company made no
investment in the gas-producing enterprise and did not look solely to
extraction and sale for a return of its investment. The court found Bank-
line Oil Co. 203 to be controlling, describing the pipeline company's inter-
est as an economic advantage. 2° Finally, the court of appeals concluded
that the pipeline company did not have an economic interest because it
was "not seeking, through its recoupment right, a profit from the extrac-
tion of gas.",20 5 If the company recovered its prepayment in a future
year, it simply received produced gas it had already paid for. Profits
would be derived solely from the remarketing of the gas.
Although the court of appeals began its analysis of the second half
of the economic interest test with some confusion, its ultimate rationale
has some merit. The initial part of the analysis imported the illusory
"investment" requirement of the first half of the test into the second half
of the test. In continuing, however, the court applied Bankline Oil Co.
by focusing on language in Kirby Petroleum Co.20 6 and Burton-Sutton Oil
Co. 207 describing the hallmark of an economic interest as looking to ex-
traction for the possibility of profit, as opposed to looking to extraction
202. Freede, 864 F.2d at 674.
203. See supra part II.B.3.
204. Freede, 864 F.2d at 676-77.
205. Id. at 677.
206. See supra part II.B.7.
207. See supra part II.B.8.
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for a return of capital. Because the percentage depletion allowance in
fact has little to do with capital recovery, focusing on extraction as a
source of profit, as opposed to a source of recovery of capital, may make
some sense. Further, because the pipeline company in Freede presuma-
bly paid Freede a price that reflected the market price for produced gas
immediately upon production, not the value of gas in the ground, no
unrealized appreciation inhered in the gas owned by the pipeline com-
pany; the gas would have a value greater than the price paid for it only
after transportation. The pipeline company thus is distinguishable from
a producer, who seeks a profit through the appreciation in the value of
the mineral realized by the act of production.
On the other hand, the test for an economic interest under Palmer v.
Bender and Treasury Regulation, section 1.611-1(b)(1), does not require
that the taxpayer look to extraction and sale for a profit, but rather for a
return of capital.2 °8 Thus, unless the test has metamorphosed over the
years, strictly construing the definition of an economic interest would
result in the pipeline company having acquired an economic interest.
Perhaps in altering the test for an economic interest to deny Freede the
loan treatment he sought, the court of appeals was seeking a result con-
sistent with normal business practice, under which the industry views
payments under a take-or-pay contract as advance payments for gas,
even though the court was unable or unwilling to articulate this basis for
its conclusion. At the root of the problem is an almost irreconcilable
tension between section 451 of the Code, which generally treats advance
payments for goods as income in the year of receipt, and section 636(a),
which sets up a contrary rule with respect to advance payments for min-
erals in the ground.
III. SELECTED TRANSACTIONAL PROBLEM AREAS
A. Distinguishing Leases from Sales
The economic interest test is used to distinguish a lease of a mineral
property from a sale of a mineral property for federal income tax pur-
poses. If the transferor has not retained an economic interest in the de-
posit, other than a retained production payment, then the transaction is
taxed as a sale. If the transferor retains an economic interest in the de-
posit, the transaction is a lease and the transferor will realize ordinary
208. See supra part II.A.
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income subject to depletion in the case of leases of oil and gas, solid min-
erals other than coal or iron ore, and coal or iron ore not subject to
section 631(c) of the Code.2"9 Coal and iron are not subject to section
631(c) if either the holding period requirement of that section has not
been met or if the transferor's tax rate on ordinary income does not ex-
ceed its tax rate on capital gains (as is true for all taxpayer's other than
high-income individuals).210 In the case of a disposition of coal or iron
ore in which the transferor retains an economic interest because the lease
meets the requirements of section 631(c) and the lessor is not entitled to
any capital gains preference, the lessor receives section 1231
treatment.21
If the only retained economic interest in a transfer is a production
payment under section 636(b),212 the transaction will be treated as a sale
with a purchase money mortgage loan and the transfer will not be treated
as having an economic interest.2 13 Regardless of whether a deferred pay-
ment sale is evidenced by a recourse or nonrecourse obligation, a mineral
property may be sold in an installment sale under section 453 of the
Code. If, however, the deferred payments are neither subject to a fixed
ceiling nor payable over a limited time, the transaction may be
recharacterized as a lease and the payments treated as royalties.21 4 Such
a recharacterization is unlikely, however, if the purchase money indebt-
edness is a bona fide recourse obligation.
The numerous cases dealing with whether the taxpayer has retained
an economic interest in a purported sale transaction have focused on a
variety of factors. O'Connor v. Commissioner21 5 is a fairly recent exposi-
tion by the Tax Court of the test for distinguishing sales from leases
based upon a "risk analysis" determination of whether the taxpayer re-
tained an economic interest. In Revenue Ruling 69-352 and Revenue
Ruling 69-466, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that the intent of the
parties to characterize the transaction as either a sale or a lease was not
relevant; whether the transferor retained an economic interest was the
209. See I.R.C. § 631(c) (1988); Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946);
Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 299 (1932);
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Rev. Rul. 69-352, 1969-1 C.B. 34.
210. See I.RLC. §§ l(a), (h), 11 (West Supp. 1991).
211. Id. § 1231 (1988). See generally John C. Coggin, III, Dispositions of Coal Interests: Section
631(c), 29 TAx LAw. 95 (1975).
212. See supra part Il.C.7.a.
213. See Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(a)(1), (c) Ex. 3 (1973).
214. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1T(c)(4) (as amended in 1981).
215. 78 T.C. 1 (1982).
1992]
39
McMahon: A Capsule View of the History and Importance of the Economic Inte
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
only relevant inquiry.2" 6 Some older cases have distinguished sales from
leases based on the parties' intent2 17 while more recent cases expressly
adopt the economic interest test.21 8
The presence and structure of complicated advance minimum roy-
alty provisions also may influence whether a transaction is a sale or a
lease. In Deskins v. Commissioner,219 the taxpayer disposed of coal pur-
suant to a document entitled "Coal Lease." Under the "lease," the tax-
payer was to receive an annual minimum royalty of $430,000 for ten
years. The royalty was recoupable by the lessee and total royalties were
limited to $4.3 million over the life of the lease. The taxpayer retained no
reversionary interest in any of the minerals, even if minerals remained
unmined at the end of ten years. Because the transferor was entitled to
receive exactly $4.3 million regardless of the amount of coal mined by
the transferee, she had not retained an economic interest. Accordingly,
the Tax Court held that the transaction was a sale, not a lease.220 Thus,
under section 483 of the Code, interest was to be imputed on the deferred
payments; the imputed interest was taxable as ordinary income, and only
the remainder of the "royalties" were treated as an amount realized on
the sale of a capital or section 1221 asset, which would be accorded a
preferential tax rate.221 If the transaction had been a lease under section
631(c) as in effect for the year in question, all payments would have been
treated as amounts realized on the sale of section 1231 property.222
B. Distinguishing Contract Miners from Lessees
Sometimes the owner of a mineral deposit leases the deposit to an-
other person to operate, but the lessee concurrently agrees to sell all or a
portion of the mine output to the lessor or to meet the lessor's require-
ments for mineral supplies. In such a case it may be difficult to deter-
mine whether the lease is a true lease or whether the lease and the output
or requirements contract combined amount in substance to a contract
mining arrangement. Cases confronting this problem consider all of the
216. Rev. Rul. 69-352, 1969-1 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 69-466, 1969-2 C.B. 140; see also Rev. Rul. 82-
221, 1982-2 C.B. 113.
217. See, ag., West v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795
(1946); Jahn v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 452 (1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973).
218. See, eg., Whitehead v. United States, 555 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1977); O'Connor v. Commis-
sioner, 78 T.C. 1 (1982).
219. 87 T.C. 305 (1986).
220. Id. at 323.
221. Id. at 322-24.
222. Id. at 322-23.
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facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. The following
cases are illustrative.
In Adkins v. Commissioner,23 a purported lessee was held actually
to be a contract miner. The taxpayer leased coal under a series of one
year renewable leases. The leases provided that no royalties were due on
coal sold to the lessor. Concurrently, the lessee executed an output con-
tract under which the lessee agreed to sell all of the extracted coal to the
corporate parent of the lessor corporation at a fixed price per ton, subject
to certain adjustments if there was a significant change in the market
price of coal. Either party could terminate the contract if they failed to
agree on the price. The lessor paid all real estate taxes, royalties, and
mine engineering costs. The Tax Court found Paragon Jewel Coal 24
controlling and held that the taxpayer was a contract miner.22 5 The de-
terminative facts that the lessee was in reality a contract miner were that
the "lessee" was not required to pay any royalties on coal sold to the
lessor's corporate parent and that all of the extracted coal, except for de
minimis amounts sold to lessee's employees, was sold to the lessor's cor-
porate parent.
A similar result was reached in Bolling v. Commissioner.226 The tax-
payer-lessee entered into a lease of indefinite term, subject to termination
on thirty days notice. Fixed sum royalties were due to the lessor on all
coal extracted, but the parties simultaneously entered into a requirements
contract under which the lessor had an option to purchase the mine out-
put at "a price or prices to be agreed upon." 22 7 In practice the price paid
more nearly reflected the lessee's extraction costs than it did the market
price for the extracted coal. Although the lessee was required to
purchase the surface rights because the lessor held only mineral rights,
that purchase was not considered to be sufficient to give him an economic
interest by analogy to Southwest Exploration Co.228 The court concluded
that Parsons22 9 controlled, stating that the cost of the surface rights could
be deducted.
Thornberry Construction Co. v. United States,23 0 which reached the
opposite conclusion from Adkins and Bolling, indicates that the price
223. 51 T.C. 957 (1969), acq. in result, 1970-1 C.B. xv.
224. See supra part II.B.11.
225. Adkins, 51 T.C. 967-68.
226. 37 T.C. 754 (1962).
227. Id. at 757.
228. See supra part II.B.9.
229. See supra part II.B.10.
230. 576 F.2d 346 (Ct. CI. 1978).
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structure of the arrangement may be an important element in finding a
true lease as opposed to a contract mining arrangement. The lessor,
which was in the business of operating coal properties, owned a coal de-
posit it did not want to operate and which it leased to the taxpayer on the
condition that the taxpayer execute requirements contracts with valued
customers of the lessor. The lease called for fixed royalties, but was ter-
minable if the output was not sold to the designated customers. The
customers, however, were unrelated to the lessor, and the lessee indepen-
dently negotiated the sales contracts with the customers. The lessee bore
all development and operating costs, including the acquisition of certain
surface rights. The arrangement was held to be a true lease, not a con-
tract mining agreement, because the lease "conferred upon [the lessee]
the rights to mine coal and to sell that coal, at whatever price it could
obtain therefor, to an independent, unrelated third party (albeit a valued
customer of [the lessor]) and not to [the lessor] itself. '2 31
Notwithstanding that the opinion in Thornberry Construction cites
both the price structure and the independence of the purchaser from the
lessor as factors important to finding a true lease, there is a basis for
concluding that the price structure may be the single most important
factor. In Revenue Ruling 72-477,232 the Internal Revenue Service held
that a lessee acquired an economic interest in a mineral deposit despite a
contemporaneous agreement to sell a portion of the output to the lessor.
The mining company leased a coal deposit from a utility company for a
term of twenty-one years, subject to the lessee's right to extend the lease
for ten years if the coal was not worked-out at the end of the initial term.
The lessee was required to pay royalties at a fixed amount, which was
stated in the ruling to be reasonable, subject to adjustment to reflect
changes in the Wholesale Price Index. Contemporaneously, the lessee
agreed to sell and the lessor-utility agreed to purchase a specified amount
of coal annually, but the utility company retained the right to increase
the amount. The price of the coal was determined under a formula based
on the mining company's costs, excluding the royalties, plus an adminis-
trative charge and a profit factor, subject to adjustment to reflect changes
in the Wholesale Price Index. The ruling states that the price was "sub-
stantially equivalent to the open market price of coal.' '2 33 The supply
agreement, like the lease, was for a twenty-one year term, but could be
231. Id at 353.
232. Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310, modified, Rev. Rul. 83-160, 1983-2 C.B. 99.
233. Id at 311.
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extended by the utility company if the lease was extended. The lessee had
the right to sell any extracted coal in excess of the amount required
under the sales contract. Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service
concluded that the agreements were not coterminous because the supply
agreement could terminate prior to termination of the lease. On these
facts the Service concluded that the mining company-lessee had acquired
an economic interest because "the compensation [it] received from the
utility company represents a share of the coal or proceeds of its sale." '234
Revenue Ruling 86-8 1235 is a further indication that the Internal
Revenue Service views the price structure as the key to determining the
presence of an economic interest. The ruling held that a lessee, under a
lease requiring a reasonable royalty, but who was obligated to sell the
entire output to the lessor, had acquired an economic interest where the
sale of the extracted coal was to be at market price and the lessee had the
right to mine to exhaustion or for a longer term. The lessor, who
purchased the coal unprocessed and applied processes that would be con-
sidered mining processes if applied by the taxpayer, was found to have
retained no economic interest other than the right to royalties.236
Revenue Ruling 73-32,237 however, injects some confusion into the
criteria for distinguishing leases from contract mining agreements. A
power company leased a coal deposit to a joint venture, consisting of a
subsidiary of the power company and an unrelated mining company, for
sixteen years. Royalties were due on all coal mined from the property.
The parties simultaneously executed a contract under which the lessee
dedicated reserves sufficient to supply the power company-lessor's needs,
although the lessee was permitted to sell a limited amount of coal on the
market annually. The only information that the ruling provides regard-
ing the price to be paid to the joint venture by the power company was
that "[t]he price paid by the power company for coal supplied by the
joint venture Was stated in the coal supply agreement., 238 The joint ven-
ture transported the coal to the power company facilities where it was
processed. The power company's subsidiary provided all of the equip-
ment, the mining company provided the management, and each joint
234. Id. at 312.
235. Rev. Rul. 86-81, 1986-1 C.B. 249.
236. Id. at 250. It is worth noting that although the ruling does not specify whether the "lessee"
was a true lessee or a percentage of sales contract miner, the conclusion that the lessor was not
entitled to treat income from the sale of the coal as gross income from mining compels the conclu-
sion that the lessee was a true lessee.
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venturer provided one half of the working capital. Under the joint ven-
ture agreement, the power company's subsidiary received a fixed fee per
ton for the use of its equipment and the mining company received a fixed
fee per ton for its management; remaining profits were divided equally.
On these facts, the Service held that the joint venture had acquired
an economic interest in the coal deposit because the lease was not termi-
nable on short notice and the joint venture looked "for its compensation
solely to the extraction and sale of the coal. '2 39 Nevertheless, the facts of
this ruling may more closely resemble those in Adkins and Boiling than
those in Thornberry Construction, Revenue Ruling 72-477, and Revenue
Ruling 86-81. Any meaningful analysis or application of Revenue Rul-
ing 73-32 is impossible because of the lack of detail regarding the price
structure.
C. Joint Ventures
Occasionally the form of a joint venture raises questions regarding
which of the joint venturers has an economic interest and is entitled to
depletion. Making this determination is not usually difficult because
joint ventures are partnerships for tax purposes, 24° and if the partnership
is a bona-fide lessee, the partnership will have an economic interest and
allocate depletion among the partners. 24' Thus, Revenue Ruling 77-1
held that a partnership or corporation operating a "captive mine" holds
the economic interest and is the proper taxpayer to claim the depletion
allowance. 242
However, section 761(a) of the Code permits certain partnerships to
elect out of Subchapter K, which governs taxation of partnerships and
partners.2 4 3 If such an election is made, the joint venturers are treated
for most purposes as if they were not partners but were co-owners of the
deposit. To make this election the partners must reserve the right to take
production in kind, must not actually jointly sell production, and it must
239. Id. at 302.
240. See Bentex Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 565 (1953) (holding that an oil and gas joint
operating agreement is a partnership); PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 19 (1991).
241. See I.R.C. §§ 701-704 (West Supp. 1991). Under current law, oil and gas partnerships
allocate depletable basis and the partners compute depletion independently. See I.R.C.
§§ 613A(c)(7)(D), 703(a)(2)(F) (West Supp. 1991).
242. Rev. Rul. 77-1, 1977-1 C.B. 161.
243. I.R.C. § 761(a) (1988).
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be possible to compute taxable income without reference to the partner-
ship rules. 2" Although some joint ventures may escape initial partner-
ship classification because of unique arrangements, such occurrences are
rare.
Revenue Ruling 74-469 held that both X Corporation and Y Corpo-
ration held an economic interest in a mineral deposit that they operated
under a joint venture arrangement.24 X Corporation, which held certain
mineral leases, granted to Y Corporation the right to mine the leased
deposits to exhaustion. Y obtained all permits in X's name. X paid all
royalties and conducted all extraction activity, processing, and storage.
Under the agreement, however, title to the minerals was vested in X and
Y in specified shares, and each sold its share separately through an in-
dependent agent. Whether X Corporation should be treated as holding
an operating interest or a royalty payable in kind is not clear from the
ruling.
IV. TREATMENT OF PAYMENTS BETWEEN HOLDERS OF DIFFERENT
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE SAME PROPERTY
Except for the treatment of contract miners and licensees, and to a
limited extent lessees under short-notice terminable leases, the economic
interest concept has focused primarily on identifying those nonoperating
interests in mineral properties that give rise to depletable income. A co-
rollary of the recipient's right to claim depletion with respect to a pay-
ment from the holder of a working interest is the denial of depletion to
the holder of the working interest with respect to that payment. This
section summarizes the treatment of both the payor and payee, including
eligibility for percentage depletion, with respect to amounts paid or re-
ceived pursuant to mineral leases.246
A. Royalties
Royalties received by a lessor or sublessor are depletable income,
whether reserved as a royalty in a prime lease or as an overriding royalty
upon a sublease of assignment of the lease.247 A carved-out overriding
244. See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2 (1972). See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Availability
and Effect of Elections Out of Partnership Status Under Section 761(a), 9 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1989).
245. Rev. Rul. 74-469, 1974-2 C.B. 178.
246. Determination of the amount of depletable income realized from operations by the holder
of a working or operating interest is beyond the scope of this article. For discussion of this topic, see
McMahon, Coal Depletion, supra note 113, and McMahon, Fundamentals, supra note 2.
247. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
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royalty is depletable without regard to the nature of the consideration
paid for the royalty.2 41 Similarly, a royalty received in consideration of
wheelage or surface rights is an economic interest entitling the holder to
depletion.249 A net profits interest in a mineral deposit is an economic
interest, whether retained on assignment of the lease or in a sublease or
carved out, for example, as a dividend by a corporation to its sharehold-
ers. Receipts by the holder of the interest are depletable by the holder of
the net profits interest and excludable by the owner of the working
interest. 250
A royalty expressed as a fixed sum per unit of mineral extracted
from the property is an economic interest.251 This is true even though
the lessor's income does not vary with the market price. However, Par-
sons v. Smith252 and Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner2"3 might
indicate that where income from extraction varies only with the number
of units extracted, without reference to price or value fluctuations, in-
come from the interest is not depletable.254
Some cases indicate that when a royalty is paid in kind, or, in the
case of oil and gas, when the royalty is paid directly to the lessor by the
purchaser pursuant to a division order, the lessee excludes the amount of
the royalty from gross income for purposes of section 61 of the Code.255
A number of other cases, however, indicate that when the lessee receives
a cash payment for the full price of the mineral and remits the royalty in
cash, the lessee should take the full sales price into account as cost of
goods sold in the case of an operating interest, or gross income in the
case of a sublessor, and then take depletion into account as part of cost of
248. See Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 17 (holding that receipt of a carved-out royalty received
for services rendered to a mineral owner other than in development or exploration of the deposit is
income when received because it is an economic interest, which is a property right for tax purposes);
Rev. Rul. 77-84, 1977-1 C.B. 173 (holding that a carved-out royalty with respect to mineral property
received in consideration of rendering services in connection with the acquisition of a second prop-
erty, was an economic interest in the first property); Rev. Rul. 73-80, 1973-1 C.B. 308 (holding that a
royalty received in exchange for assignment of an outstanding option to purchase a mineral property
is an economic interest).
249, Omer v. United States, 329 F.2d 393, 395 n.2 (6th Cir. 1964).
250. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); Beach Petroleum Corp. v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 654 (1946); Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,907 (Oct. 8, 1982).
251. Bankers' Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308 (1932); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.613-
2(c)(5) (as amended in 1977).
252. 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
253. 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
254. See discussion supra parts II.B.10, II.B.11.
255. See, eg., Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
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goods sold or a deductible expense, as appropriate.256 However, in deter-
mining the lessee's "gross income from the property" for purposes of
depletion, royalties are excluded whether paid in cash, in kind, or pursu-
ant to a division order.257
B. Advance Minimum Royalties, Bonuses and Delay Rentals
1. Generally
Advance minimum royalties received with respect to solid minerals
are includable in income and subject to depletion by the lessor in the year
of receipt or accrual, even though not earned.258
Bonus payments received by a lessor are also depletable.25 9 If a pro-
duction payment is retained in a sublease or assignment of a lease to-
gether with a royalty or net profits interest, under section 636(c) the
production payment is treated as a lease bonus payable in installments,
and the payments will be eligible for depletion by the lessor.2 ° Option
payments received with respect to a lease or assignment of a lease are
depletable as a bonus.261 If a bonus is received in connection with the
transfer of a working property, including depreciable equipment and
structures, a portion of the bonus will be treated as an amount realized
upon the sale of the depreciable property.262
Pursuant to section 613A(d)(5) of the Code, bonuses, advance royal-
ties, or any other amount payable without regard to production that are
received with respect to an oil or gas property after August 16, 1986, in a
taxable year ending after that date, are not eligible for percentage deple-
tion.2 63 Advance royalties and bonuses received with respect to oil and
256. See Commissioner v. Jamison Coal & Coke Co., 67 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1933) (advance mini-
mum royalties); Ramsay v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 793, 810 (1984) (purported advance minimum
royalties); Buffalo Eagle Mines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 843, 850 (1938) (royalties); see also
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-1T(b)(2)(iii)(K) (1987) (requiring treatment of depletion as an inven-
tory cost for any producer of minerals, oil or gas).
257. I.R.C. § 613(a) (West Supp. 1991); Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312
(1934).
258. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(b)(1), (d) (as amended in 1991); Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206
(1984); Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934); McLean v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 569
(1970), nonacq., 1972-2 C.B. 4; Handelman v. United States, 357 F.2d 694 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Rev. Rul.
72-165, 1972-1 C.B. 177.
259. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(1), (d); see Engle, 464 U.S. at 227; Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287
U.S. 299 (1932); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
260. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-2(b) (1973).
261. Westates v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 35 (1953).
262. Choate v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 1 (1945). For application of this principle, see, e.g.,
Kline v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1959), and Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v.
Commissioner, 6 T.C. 172 (1946).
263. I.R.C. § 613A(d)(5) (1988).
19921
47
McMahon: A Capsule View of the History and Importance of the Economic Inte
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
gas properties continue to be eligible for cost depletion.
Merely possessing an economic interest does not assure that all re-
ceipts of a lessor or sublessor will be entitled to depletion. Only receipts
related to production or, as is the case with advance royalties and bo-
nuses, receipts that are viewed in lieu of, rather than in addition to, pro-
duction royalties are depletable. Accordingly, no depletion is allowed
with respect to delay rentals, which are more commonly associated with
oil and gas leases than solid mineral leases. 26  "A delay rental is an
amount paid for the privilege of deferring development of the property
and which could have been avoided by abandonment of the lease, or by
commencement of development operations, or by obtaining produc-
tion.126 6 Thus, delay rentals are unrelated to production; they are re-
lated to nonproduction.
2. Recapture of Depletion on Bonuses and Advance Royalties
Allowance of depletion upon receipt of payments in advance of pro-
duction does not assure permanent allowance of depletion with respect to
the payment. If a lease is surrendered by the lessee prior to any produc-
tion, cost or percentage depletion previously claimed with respect to a
bonus must be recaptured in the lessor's income.267 Even slight commer-
cial production prevents recapture. 268 Furthermore, if a lessor receives a
bonus and disposes of the entire leasehold interest prior to abandonment,
the recapture rule does not apply.26 9 If, however, the lessor disposes of
only an undivided fractional interest in the lease prior to its abandon-
ment by the lessee, recapture will be required.270
In contrast to recapture of depletion on bonuses, which is an all or
nothing proposition, recapture of depletion on advance royalties is more
precise. Depletion claimed by a lessor with respect to advance royalties
is subject to recapture if the lease is abandoned prior to extraction of all
of the minerals to which the advance royalties relate.271 Only depletion
264. For computation of cost depletion on bonus and advance royalty payments, see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.612-3.
265. Id. § 1.612-3(c)(2).
266. Id. § 1.612-3(c)(1). See White Castle Lumber & Shingle Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d
1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1973) (treating acreage selection bonuses as delay rentals).
267. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(2); Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944).
268. Crabb v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 686 (1940), nonacq., 1968-1 C.B. 3, and aff'd, 119 F.2d
772 (5th Cir. 1941). But see Campbell v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 91, 93-94 (1963) (questioning
Crabb).
269. Rev. Rul. 60-336, 1960-2 C.B. 195.
270. See Waggoner v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 699 (1942).
271. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(b)(2).
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on advance royalties relating to minerals for which royalties have been
paid, but which remain in the ground upon abandonment, are recap-
tured. As a result of recapture, the lessor increases the depletable basis
of the deposit pro tanto.
3. Lessee's Treatment of Advance Royalties and Bonus
Payments
a. Advance Royalties
Advance royalties paid by a lessee are excluded from gross income
from the property in computing the lessee's depletion allowance and are
deducted from gross income in computing taxable income in the year of
sale of the mineral to which the royalties relate, rather than in the year of
payment or accrual.272 At the lessee's election, however, advance royal-
ties paid under a lease provision requiring substantially uniform mini-
mum royalties over a period of at least twenty years, or, if less, the life of
the lease, including renewals, may be deducted in the year of payment or
accrual when computing taxable income under section 63 of the Code.2 73
Notwithstanding that Treasury Regulation, section 1.613-2(c)(5)(iii),
provides that advance royalties are excludable from gross income from
the property in computing depletion in the same year they are de-
ducted-in this case in the year paid or accrued-Revenue Ruling 79-
386 held that the lessee must exclude substantially uniform advance min-
imum royalties from gross income from the property in the year of sale of
the mineral to which the royalties relate, even though the lessee has made
a valid election to deduct such royalties in the year paid or accrued. 74
b. Bonus Payments
Lease bonus payments are treated similar to advance royalties in
computing the depletion allowance. Each year the lessee excludes from
gross income from the property the portion of the bonus allocable to
minerals sold during that year.75 This allocation spreads the lease bonus
over the estimated reserves in a manner similar to the formula for cost
depletion. 76
Although a lease bonus is excluded from gross income from the
272. Id. §§ 1.613-2(c)(5)(iii), 1.612-3(b)(3).
273. Id. § 1.612-3(b)(3).
274. Rev. Rul. 79-386, 1979-2 C.B. 246.
275. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii); Rev. Rul. 79-73, 1979-1 C.B. 218.
276. See Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii) Ex. 1.
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property under section 613(a) for purposes of computing the depletion
allowance, when computing the lessee's taxable income, the bonus alloca-
ble to the year of sale is neither excluded from gross income under sec-
tion 61277 nor deductible under any other Code section in determining
taxable income.2 78 The bonus is a capital expenditure, added to the
lessee's depletable basis of the mineral deposit and recovered through
depletion.2 79 Nevertheless, the bonus payment must be excluded from
the lessee's gross income from the property because it is depletable to the
lessor.280 The effect of requiring capitalization by the lessee of lease bo-
nus payments is to deny the lessee any effective tax recovery of the bonus
expenditure when percentage depletion is claimed.
C. Carved-Out Production Payments
Because of the unique treatment accorded to payments from one
holder of an economic interest to another, Congress has statutorily modi-
fied the treatment of production payments. Only carved-out production
payments the proceeds of which are pledged to, and used for, exploration
or development of the burdened property constitute an economic inter-
est. Payments in liquidation of such a production payment are deplet-
able to the holder and excludable by the owner of the working interest.2 81
If the proceeds of a production payment were not pledged to exploration
or development of the burdened property, or were used for any other
purpose, such as to finance production, the carved-out production pay-
ment is treated as a mortgage loan.2 82
V. CONCLUSION
The economic interest concept never has been easy to understand or
apply. This difficulty is attributable in part to its gradual development as
a judicial doctrine, with its parameters being defined on a case-by-case
277. I.R.C. § 61 (West Supp. 1991).
278. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(3); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 377
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 962 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945); Rev. Rul. 79-73, 1979-1 C.B. 218.
279. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(3); see Murphy Oil Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 677 (8th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979 (1965).
280. See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a). Thus, an oil and gas lessee must exclude bonuses and advance
royalties on which the lessor may not claim percentage depletion, because the lessor may claim cost
depletion.
281. See I.R.C. § 636(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(b) (1973).
282. See generally McMahon, Production Primer, supra note 153.
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basis. Another factor contributing to the doctrine's ambiguity is its ap-
plication to both operating (or working) interests and nonoperating inter-
ests, which constitute significantly different bundles of rights and
obligations and are created in significantly different manners. A third
reason for continuing difficulty in applying the economic interest doc-
trine is that the classic test for an economic interest is formulated with
reference to an "investment" in the deposit and "return of capital." Be-
cause both operating and nonoperating interests in mineral deposits often
are acquired without making any investment in a tax sense, i.e., the
owner of the interest has not made any expenditure capitalized into the
basis of the deposit, the formal test is in fact nonsensical. In practice, the
Internal Revenue Service and the courts both have been compelled to
examine the issue by putting the cart before the horse; that is, analyzing
on a policy basis whether on all the facts the taxpayer putatively holding
an economic interest ought to be allowed percentage depletion and find-
ing that the taxpayer holds an economic interest if that question is an-
swered in the affirmative. United States v. Swank illustrates this
backward reasoning better than any other case.283
As a matter of historical analysis, certain broad generalizations can
be deduced from the pattern of the cases. Any person owning the fee or
leasehold interest in a mineral deposit has an economic interest. On the
other hand, the right to gross production, less a royalty paid, is not nec-
essarily an economic interest if the interest is not formally a lease. Licen-
sees generally are denied an economic interest, apparently because their
interests in the deposit are too tenuous. However, a person having a
right to a fractional share of gross production for the life of the deposit,
such as an overriding royalty, has an economic interest, apparently
whether the right is created by deed or otherwise.
Rights to a fixed sum of money for every unit of mineral extracted
from deposit, however, are not necessarily an economic interest. The
passive holder of a fixed-sum-per-unit royalty has an economic interest,
while the miner who actively extracts minerals on behalf of the lessee or
owner in consideration of a fixed sum for every unit of extracted mineral,
i.e., a contract miner, does not have an economic interest. In the ab-
stract, this distinction makes no sense, but when the question is consid-
ered in context, the distinction may be reasonable.
The status of a right to a share of the profits from a mineral deposit
is not always as easily categorized. A deeded net profits royalty, for
283. See supra part II.A.12.
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whatever reason created, always should be an economic interest. But a
net profits interest created by contract may be subject to a facts and cir-
cumstances scrutiny, such as that in Commissioner v. Southwest Explora-
tion Co.,284 and if the holder of the right had no prior connection with
the deposit, the interest may not be an economic interest.
Whenever a unique arrangement is examined, the policy behind the
percentage depletion allowance always looms as an influential, even
though sometimes hidden, factor in the analysis. Thorough examination
of the development of the economic interest doctrine reveals that the
words of the definition long ago lost their plain meaning. The regulatory
definition of economic interest as a whole, and its individual component
words, have become abstract terms of art. Applying these abstract terms
of art, however, requires careful attention to both the formalism and real
substance of the arrangement under scrutiny.
284. See supra part II.A.9.
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